MooMoo is a specialty beverage brand defined by a commitment to health and premium sourcing. The company distinguishes itself through the exclusive use of 100% Hokkaido fresh milk to ensure superior taste and strict safety standards. By focusing on reduced sugar and high-quality ingredients, the brand offers a healthier alternative in a market often dominated by artificial creamers.

Leslie Meng is the founder of MooMoo and brings a unique technical background to the beverage industry. She earned a degree in Biomedical Engineering from Boston University and initially established a successful career as a software engineer in Taiwan. Despite the stability of the tech sector, she chose to apply her analytical skills to entrepreneurship by launching a brand that reflects her personal values and standards for quality.

The Spark Behind the Brand

The concept for MooMoo originated from Leslie’s time as a student in the United States. She frequently missed the authentic flavors of Taiwan but found that many local boba shops relied on unhealthy ingredients and excessive sweetness. She recognized a significant gap in the market for drinks that were both nutritious and enjoyable. This realization became the foundation of her business mission.

The brand name MooMoo serves as a memorable and approachable identity for the company. It draws inspiration from the sound of a cow and serves as a tribute to her family's cat named Popo. Leslie chose this name to ensure it was easy for customers to recall while creating a positive psychological connection with the brand.

Overcoming Early Obstacles

The transition from engineering to retail presented several immediate challenges. The shop initially operated at a loss and struggled to build a steady customer base. During this period, Leslie faced online criticism from skeptics who doubted her premium business model. She maintained her focus by prioritizing the needs of her local supporters in the Beitou district, whose repeat visits provided the necessary momentum to sustain the business.

A critical turning point occurred in November 2024 when an outbreak of Lumpy Skin Disease in Japan disrupted the supply of Hokkaido milk. This event threatened the very core of the brand identity. Rather than compromising her standards by switching to lower-quality milk, Leslie adapted her menu to feature more diverse beverage options. This resilience not only preserved the brand’s integrity but also attracted a wider range of customers who appreciated her refusal to lower quality.

The Logic of Premium Ingredients

The use of Hokkaido milk is the most significant differentiator for the brand. Leslie selected this ingredient because it provides a consistent flavor profile and meets rigorous regulatory standards. Although the import costs are higher, the choice creates a clear distinction between MooMoo and its competitors.

From a financial perspective, this represents a deliberate strategic trade-off. Leslie does not prioritize cost minimization. Instead, she focuses on value maximization. She understands that consumers are willing to pay a premium for a product they trust. This approach ensures long-term sustainability by building brand loyalty through excellence.

Redefining Investment and Profit

The business strategy for MooMoo often extends beyond traditional accounting metrics. Leslie frequently sponsors drinks for school events despite the lack of immediate financial returns. While some might view this as an inefficient use of resources, she considers it an investment in brand goodwill. She believes that creating a genuine connection with one individual is worth the material cost.

Her philosophy on leadership emphasizes three essential skills for any founder. First, an entrepreneur must have the intuition to judge the fundamental profitability of a business. Second, they must recognize that time is a significant cost and avoid getting bogged down in minor details. Finally, she advocates for collaboration with specialists. By working with experts who excel in data and mathematics, she can focus her energy on high-level strategy and growth.

Looking Toward the Future

The current operations in Taipei serve as a testing ground for broader expansion. Leslie is refining her business processes to prepare for new locations with a specific focus on the technology sector in Hsinchu. Her long-term vision includes expanding across Taiwan and eventually returning to Boston to establish an international presence for the brand.

Interview Conducted by: FLY to the world Taiwan

Article Written by: Nathan S.

As previously mentioned, Taiwan is among the world’s top gaming markets. According to a survey conducted in 2025 by Taiwan’s Market Intelligence and Consulting Institute (MIC), 81.4% of Taiwanese internet users play digital games. This shows that gaming is deeply ingrained in Taiwanese culture.1 Furthermore, this survey also states that 83.9% of internet users also play mobile games. Mobile gaming is usually associated with younger players as smartphones or ipads can allow children or teens without laptops to participate in gaming. In turn, this exposure to digital gaming also exposes them to digital marketplaces, where previously mentioned virtual items can be bought.

“Free games usually aren’t free” is something anyone who has gamed before is aware of. Although many games may not require payment to be installed, a large amount of players end up spending money inside the game anyway. Data, once again from MIC, states that 35.5% of Taiwanese gamers pay for in-game content—which includes virtual items in the form of game currency, character skins, or other special items.2

35.5% doesn’t sound like a lot, and it is also true that spending levels aren’t usually high. Focus Taiwan found that 72.1% of those who buy digital products spent less than NT$1,000 per month.3 But purchases add up and end up amounting to a lot of money. Additionally, for teens, less than NT$1000 per month might still be a lot, as they are reliant on allowances or part-time earnings.

But what is the reason that teens are so drawn to digital goods and games in the first place? Most popular games, especially mobile ones, use a free-to-play model. In free-to-play game models, companies generate revenue through optional purchases instead of initial installing fees. Gaming industries, including Taiwan’s gaming industry, have managed to develop highly optimized in-game purchasing systems which urge players to spend money through presenting limited-time offers, convenient progression boosts or skips, as well as skins and other cosmetic upgrades.4

Additionally, researchers of digital game economies emphasize psychological incentives such as reward loops and urgency cues that are common in games and get players to spend money. The utilization of these psychological incentives are intentional—game makers specifically design these systems to influence player behavior and manipulate spending patterns, especially for younger players.5

From an economic perspective, the youth’s shift towards spending more on digital goods highlights how consumption is becoming more virtual. Virtual markets are becoming more prominent, even if they haven’t overtaken physical markets. Items bought on virtual markets can offer advantages in games, or social status and self-expression in non-game platforms, much like what items bought on physical markets offer. So, teens who spend real money on games, notably teens display adult consumption patterns, just on a smaller scale.

This may seem positive as teens are able to learn to manage funds, get a sense of monetary value, and increase financial awareness. However, this teen spending is not without concern. Research presented by TVBS highlights that 3.1% of Taiwanese adolescents show signs of gaming addiction. Contrary to how it sounds, 3.1% is a relatively high rate—Western countries, which are stereotypically less strict around teens and policing their screen time, have much lower rates.6 This doesn’t automatically mean that teens are spending more on in-game purchases, but it is highly likely that they are. This raises questions not only about youth self-control in gaming and spending, but also in consumer protection and whether corporations should be monetizing the easily manipulatable interests of youth.

It cannot be emphasized enough that this is a mainstream pattern of behavior. As previously mentioned, over 80% of Taiwanese internet users game and more than a third spend money on virtual content.7 Teens consuming so much digital goods highlights the trend of youth becoming active and influential in the digital economy. Pros and cons aside, it is undeniable that virtual purchases are shaping how teens understand money as well as their consumption patterns.

By: Sihyun P.

(https://substack.com/@hyunnpark)

Image credit: Leon Neal via Getty Images

The World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the public health emergency regarding COVID-19 had ended in May of 2023.1 Taiwan experienced an increase in international visitors since the pandemic that same year, with the number reaching almost 6.5 million.2 This rebound in the number of visitors is attributed to the slackening of travel restrictions since the official end of the health emergency.

Based on the Annual Report on Tourism 2023, Taiwan, Republic of China, Taiwan’s tourism revenue, with both inbound and domestic spending accounted for, amounted to over $24.5 billion USD. This is almost 3.3% of the nation’s GDP, highlighting the importance of the tourism industry in supporting Taiwanese economic activity and employment—even directly after the pandemic.3

On the other hand, Taiwan also has a booming domestic tourism industry. If you’ve lived in Taiwan, two of the major things you’ll realize are, one, that Taiwanese people are unusually patient, and two, that Taiwanese people are very experience-oriented.

In 2023, there were around 207 million domestic trips with an average per-person, per-trip expenditure of around $80 USD. This adds up to a total domestic tourism expenditure of over $15.9 billion USD.4 So, Taiwanese residents also contributed greatly to the resurgence of the Taiwanese tourism sector.

When it comes to employment, the tourism industry is also a significant creator of jobs. Previously, before the pandemic, an estimated 800,000 individuals were employed in tourism-related occupations, including hospitality, transportation, and retail.5 Of course, the COVID-19 pandemic led to major job losses, especially in tourism. But with the ongoing revival of the tourism industry, the number of jobs is expected to increase once more.

In fact, there is actually a labor shortage in Taiwan’s hospitality sector. The government is currently introducing the integration of migrant workers as of late 2025.6

Tourism remains a vital contributor to Taiwan’s economy in terms of both GDP and employment. Challenges mentioned, such as the labor shortage, still persist. However, the resilience displayed by the sector during COVID times and the government’s investments, tourism is expected to not only be revived but also become even more lucrative in the future.

By: Sihyun P.

(https://substack.com/@hyunnpark)

Sources compiled:

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic

• https://admin.taiwan.net.tw/upload/contentFile/auser/b/annual_2023_htm/en/01_Taiwan_Travel_Market.html?

• https://admin.taiwan.net.tw/upload/contentFile/auser/b/annual_2023_htm/en/01_Tourism_Revenue.html?

• https://taiwaninsight.org/2025/10/24/taiwans-food-culture-as-a-cure-for-overtourism/

• https://hrsea.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/taiwan-set-to-hire-8000-migrant-workers-from-the-philippines-for-hospitality-sector-by-2025/122292396?utm_source=chatgpt.com

先進封裝技術，特別是台積電的 CoWoS（晶片基板首創封裝）技術，已成為 AI 時代的軸心，從單純的技術製程轉型為戰略瓶頸。此外，台灣中央銀行於 2025 年 9 月 18 日將 2025 年的經濟成長率預測從 6 月的 3.05% 上修至 4.55%，成長主因歸功於半導體出口。今年前 8 個月，電子與資通訊（ICT）產品佔台灣總出口額的 42.2%，價值近 4,000 億美元，展現了該產業的統治地位。

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然而，央行也預測 2026 年的成長率將調整為 2.86%，並對關稅阻力及政策不確定性升高提出警告。此外，台北方面一直積極將半導體實力轉化為地緣政治籌碼。在 2025 年台北國際半導體展（SEMICON Taiwan）上，政府官員公開談論將半導體作為「晶片外交」的工具，這顯示台灣有意透過技術而非正式外交承認，來與民主盟友建立更緊密的聯繫。制度上的接軌也隨之而來，曾任台積電董事的龔明鑫出任經濟部長，進一步使國家政策與產業戰略之間的聯繫體制化。

此外，AI 供應鏈最薄弱的環節並非晶圓光刻（lithography），而是先進封裝產能。目前對 CoWoS 的需求遠超現有產出，迫使台積電必須透過在嘉義等地興建新廠來倍增產能。同時，曾相對冷門的 CoWoS 製程已成為地緣政治工具：少了它，輝達（Nvidia）的 GPU 就無法將運算晶粒與高頻寬記憶體（HBM）完美匹配，而這正是尖端 AI 與過時技術的分水嶺。

這家晶片巨頭正觸及基礎設施的極限。光是台積電一家公司，在 2021 年就消耗了台灣 6.4% 的電力；到了 2025 年，隨著晶圓廠擴建與 AI 數據中心的設立，這一比例已大幅上升。例如，鴻海與輝達在高雄的 AI 工廠，原定規劃為 100MW，現在則改為「視電力供應情況」分階段開發——這含蓄地承認了台灣電網的吃緊。產業界已要求緩漲電價，認為調高電費將侵蝕競爭力並加重家戶負擔。

更複雜的是，台灣已於 2025 年 5 月關閉最後一座核能反應爐，在承諾淨零排放的同時，卻更加依賴進口液化天然氣（LNG）。這種雙重的能源安全困境已成為存在性的政策難題。對外，台灣面臨著複雜的威脅。美國對特定台灣產品採取的關稅措施為 2026 年蒙上陰影，儘管半導體在某些類別中獲得豁免。同時，輝達對英特爾（Intel）投入的 50 億美元投資，暗示了全球 AI 運算結構可能重新洗牌。若該計畫成功，可能會稀釋台灣在先進封裝領域的壟斷地位，雖然就目前而言，領先製程仍以台灣為中心。相較之下，華為在自主晶片設計上的復甦呈現了長期的競爭制衡，加劇了區域科技競賽。

總而言之，台灣的半導體產業既是其最強大的優勢，也是其最脆弱的弱點。其帶來的經濟紅利將 GDP 成長推向超乎預期的高度，但基礎設施的脆弱性（特別是在封裝與能源方面）恐將截斷其所產生的收益。因此，在未來兩年內，台灣需要補足 CoWoS 產能、穩定能源供應，並在不犧牲比較利益的前提下平衡地緣經濟風險。若能成功，將鞏固台灣作為 AI 時代支點的地位；若失敗，則可能使其繁榮暴露在危險的變數之中。

作者：Megan C

參考資料：

• 路透社（Reuters） – 台灣央行維持基準利率於 2% 不變 https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/taiwan-cbank-leaves-benchmark-interest-rate-unchanged-2-2025-09-18

• 路透社（Reuters） – 台灣央行上修經濟成長預測，並針對關稅風險提出警告 https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/taiwan-central-bank-raises-growth-forecast-warns-tariff-risks-2025-09-18

• 聚焦台灣（Focus Taiwan / 中央社英文版） – 2025年1月至8月台灣出口表現：電子產品佔比達 42.2% https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202509200015
  
  

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But despite the seemingly booming economy and what appears to be a large amount of spendable income, the reality of working wages in Taiwan is much more sobering. Working wages for the Taiwanese, especially Taiwanese youth, have remained stagnant. How could this be, and why?

Superficially, the average wage statistics of Taiwan throughout the years have been increasing. For example, data from April of 2025 states that Taiwan’s average regular monthly wage hit NT$47,807, which is a 3.22% year-on-year increase.1 Adjust for inflation, however, and you’ll see that the real regular wages were NT$43,727, making the year-on-year increase actually a mere 1.16% gain.2 More revealing still is the median wage. In the same April of 2024, the median regular wage, known for being a more accurate statistic when looking at wages, was barely over NT$38,000 per month.3 Furthermore, a statistic collected in mid-2025 highlights a record of nearly 70% of Taiwanese employees earning below the statistical average—emphasizing how the distribution is skewed due to a few ultra-high earners.4

The situation is only grimmer for young people newly entering the workforce. The pay for fresh college graduates is a monthly average—again, keep in mind that averages are disproportionately high—of NT$34,000. The equivalent figure for high school graduates is NT$29,000.5 So, why has wage growth been so muted?

1. Corporations Prioritize Profit

This really isn’t anything new—corporations as a whole are notorious for putting profit before appreciation for their workers. From 2012 to 2021, the labor portion of Taiwan’s GDP has declined from 45.77% to 43.07%, while corporate profits’ share has increased. 6

*Analysts argue that Taiwanese firms tend to keep wages low as a means to preserve profit margins, which is necessary in fields such as manufacturing and technology due to global clients such as Apple demanding cost competitiveness.

2. Reliance on Contract Manufacturing

Save for semiconductors, most Taiwanese companies serve as “foundries,” producing for foreign brands, leading to less profit per unit, which makes wage increases difficult.

3. Weak Minimum Wage Influence

Analysts predict that the monthly minimum wage will rise from NT$28,860 to NT$29,500, a 3.2% increase, by January 2026.7 However, many labor groups fairly argue that this increase in the monthly minimum wage is minimal compared to the price hikes in utilities and living costs, advocating for a 4% increase.8

4. Sector Gaps

Overall wage growths are dragged down by salary disparities across different sectors. For example, healthcare and social work average a monthly salary of NT$76,000, and the finance and insurance industries average NT$73,000. However, less lucrative industries such as retail and hospitality average barely above NT$31,000. 9

5. Lack of young talent

There are concerns that young Taiwanese talent are leaving their country to chase more lucrative career options in countries such as the US or Singapore. If true, this could create a cycle where a lack of talent leads to less economic growth, preventing wage growth, which then pushes the next wave of young talent to leave the country.

This issue of wage stagnation has an immediate impact on young workers. Taiwan has a property price-to-income ratio that is among the highest in the world, making housing affordability more of a lack of affordability. Domestic consumption, despite how it may seem, will remain weaker due to a lack of growth in disposable income. Economists even argue that, to match Taiwan’s GDP per capita, the median wage would have to fall between NT$80,000 and NT$110,000, a ridiculously high number if you consider the real median, between NT$40,000 and NT$46,000.10

Furthermore, there are also non-economic impacts that significantly impact young people. Financial insecurity caused by low wages causes delays in marriage, and even prevents many from having children—this leads to another issue Taiwan is notorious for, a low birth rate. Additionally, there are even local sayings, such as “lying flat,” which indicate a widespread sense of disillusionment, as people feel as if their hard work doesn’t translate into better pay.

Still, there is hope. The consecutive increase in real wages for over a year, along with the government continuing to inch up the minimum wage, are both hopeful signs. Furthermore, competitive sectors such as finance and healthcare are increasing their salaries as a method to attract talent.

However, the main question regarding whether Taiwan can escape this “low wage trap” relies on a deeper structural reform. Profit distribution, labor bargaining power, and industrial strategy—problems regarding these topics need to be addressed before Taiwan can escape this vicious cycle of low wages.

By: Sihyun P.

(https://substack.com/@hyunnpark)

Sources Compiled:

1. https://hr.asia/taiwan/taiwans-wage-growth-beat-inflation-for-13th-stran on ight-month/

2. https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202506110024?/

3. https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202508110025

4. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/05/on on 03/2003836254

5. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/08/19/2003822429

6. https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202509260010

7. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/09/22/2003844218?

8. https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202505290017

9. https://international.thenewslens.com/article/186954

在本次由 FLY to the World Taiwan 進行的專訪中，林董事長分享了他如何從一名激進的投資者蛻變為紀律嚴明的策略家，並提供了一場關於風險管理與「農夫心法」的大師課。

專業背景：M&G 亞洲擴張的建築師

林長忠董事長的職業生涯以「機構卓越」為核心。在 M&G 投資任職期間，他負責領航亞洲區複雜的機構投資策略。身為歐洲債券領域的領軍企業，進入亞洲市場需要一位既能理解區域性「成長目標」，又能兼顧歐洲機構金融「資本保全」價值的領導者。林董事長成功彌合了這道鴻溝，強調風險管理與長線價值，而非投機性收益。

1. 核心哲學：保本為先

林董事長的首要準則極其簡單卻深奧：「在賺錢之前，先確保不賠錢。」 他形容自己從追求市場機會的激進「獵人」，演變為專注於長期耕耘的穩定「農夫」。

董事長洞見： 「風險管理並非一個部門，而是判斷力、紀律與理性的日常實踐。」

【深度分析】機構型「固定收益」的優勢

林董事長對「不賠錢」的堅持，深植於 M&G 作為歐洲固定收益領導者的 DNA 中。與追求無限成長的股票市場不同，債券投資的核心在於管理「下行風險」。

• 研究視角： 像林董事長所實施的機構策略，重點在於總報酬（Total Return）。1雖然散戶投資者常專注於價格波動，但機構研究顯示，對於長期財富而言，防範「回撤」（Drawdown，即大幅虧損）在數學意義上比捕捉每一次「上漲」更為重要。在金融學中，50% 的虧損需要 100% 的獲利才能回本（幾何平均報酬偏誤），這正是林董事長「農夫式謹慎」的科學依據。2

  

2. 市場透視：散戶與機構的鴻溝

林董事長觀察到在地與海外投資者之間的顯著差異。他指出，台灣投資者往往容易陷入情緒化的短期決策，而全球機構法人則傾向使用結構化的長線策略。

董事長洞見： 「台灣投資者常過度關注短利。若要在全球市場取得成功，必須轉向獨立分析，避開群眾的雜音。」

【深度分析】台灣市場的「羊群效應」

根據《2024 年台灣金融普惠指標》，儘管台灣在銀行與數位支付的滲透率極高，「散戶羊群效應」仍是市場的主要因素。

• 研究視角： 針對台灣證券交易所（TWSE）的研究指出，散戶投資者常表現出**「過度自信」與高周轉率**，這對市場穩定性具有負面影響。相比之下，像 M&G 這樣的機構投資者更傾向於支持傳統的**「證券市場線」（Security Market Line, SML）**，其報酬與經過計算的風險高度相關，而非受情緒左右。林董事長提倡的「獨立分析」正是對抗 **FOMO（錯失恐懼症）**的解毒劑。34

  

3. 培育下一代：好奇心與理財素養

當被問及對進入該領域學生的建議時，林董事長並未提及複雜的演算法或 Excel 表格，而是強調好奇心與基礎閱讀。他推薦《漫步華爾街》（A Random Walk Down Wall Street）與《富爸爸，窮爸爸》作為起點。

董事長洞見： 「對生活與市場的好奇心是第一步。透過反思與小額實驗，建立判斷所需的心理模型。」

【深度分析】青少年的素養斷層

林董事長推薦《漫步華爾街》，旨在強調**「效率市場假說」**——即幾乎不可能僅靠運氣持續擊敗市場。

• 研究視角： 2025 年最新的台灣金融素養研究顯示，雖然學生對「賺取收入」等基礎知識掌握度高，但對於複利與長期風險管理等「深層概念」仍探索不足（即便 83% 的 15-18 歲學生擁有金融帳戶，卻僅有 35% 對使用金融服務感到自信）。5林董事長建議的「小額投資實驗」正契合了金管會（FSC）目前推廣的「從做中學」模式，旨在建立青少年的風險韌性。

  

4. 領導力：對齊目標勝過職位野心

對林董事長而言，領導力不在於頭銜，而在於個人優勢與目標的對齊。他認為，若努力的方向不是為了創造意義與保護價值，那麼再多的努力也是徒勞。

董事長洞見： 「保護資本與創造價值，應優先於眼前的業績或個人頭銜。」

【深度分析】使命驅動型領導力

這反映了全球企業治理轉向 ESG 與永續投資的趨勢，這也是 M&G 在歐洲開創的領先領域。林董事長對「有意義工作的對齊」之關注，暗示了領導者的職責是確保機構的長期生存與社會價值，而非透過高風險手段追求季報達標。

結語：農夫的收穫

林長忠董事長在 M&G 台灣留下的傳承，是「農夫心法」的有力證明。在一個充滿獵人的世界裡，唯有那些理解土壤、尊重季節並保護種子的人，才能最終迎來最豐饒的收穫。

Research by: Nathan

In this exclusive interview with FLY to the World Taiwan, Chairman Lin reflects on his journey from an aggressive investor to a disciplined strategist, offering a masterclass in risk management and the “farmer” mindset.

Professional Background: The Architect of M&G’s Asian Expansion

Lin Chang-Chung’s career is defined by institutional excellence. During his tenure at M&G Investments, he was responsible for navigating complex institutional investment strategies across Asia.

M&G is globally renowned for its expertise in European bonds and fixed income. For a firm of this scale, entering the Asian market required a leader who understood both the “aggressive” growth goals of the region and the “conservative” capital preservation values of European institutional finance. Chairman Lin bridged this gap, emphasizing a disciplined approach that prioritized risk management and long-term value over speculative gains.

1. The Core Philosophy: Capital Preservation First

Chairman Lin’s primary rule: Prioritize not losing money before earning more. He describes a personal evolution from an aggressive “hunter” who chased after every market opportunity to a stable “farmer” who focuses on long-term cultivation.

His Insight: “Risk management is the daily practice of judgment, discipline, and rationality.”

Insight: The Institutional “Fixed Income” Edge

Lin’s emphasis on “not losing money” is deeply rooted in M&G’s identity as a leader in European Fixed Income. Unlike equity markets, where the goal is often uncapped growth, bond investing is about managing “downside risk.”

• The Research Perspective: Institutional strategies, like those Lin implemented, focus on Total Return.1 While retail traders often focus on price swings, institutional research shows that for long-term wealth, protecting against “drawdowns” (large losses) is more mathematically significant than catching every “uptick.”2 In finance, a 50% loss requires a 100% gain (Geometric Mean Return Bias) just to break even, a reality that fuels Lin’s “Farmer” caution.

  

2. Market Perspectives: The Gap Between Retail and Institutional

Lin observes a stark contrast between local and overseas investors. He notes that Taiwanese investors often succumb to emotional, short-term decisions, whereas global institutional players utilize structured, long-term strategies.

His Insight: “Taiwanese investors often focus on quick profits. To succeed globally, one must move toward independent analysis and avoid the noise of the crowd.”

Insight: The “Herding” Problem in Taiwan

Lin’s observation is backed by data. According to the 2024 Taiwan Financial Inclusion Indicators, while Taiwan has high banking and digital payment penetration, retail herding remains a major factor.

• The Research Perspective: Studies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) indicate that retail investors often exhibit “overconfidence” and high turnover rates, which negatively impacts the market’s stability.3 In contrast, institutional investors (like M&G) tend to support a more traditional “Security Market Line,” where returns are more closely correlated with calculated risk rather than emotional sentiment.4 Lin’s “independent analysis” is the antidote to the “Fear of Missing Out” (FOMO) that often leads retail traders to buy at market peaks.

  

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3. Cultivating the Next Generation: Curiosity and Literacy

When asked about students entering the field, Lin doesn’t point to understanding complex algorithms or mastering Excel spreadsheets. Instead, he points to curiosity and foundational reading. He recommends classics like A Random Walk Down Wall Street and Rich Dad Poor Dad as starting points.

His Insight: “Curiosity about life and markets is the first step. Reflection and small experiments build the mental models needed for judgment.”

Insight: The Literacy Gap for Young Adults

Lin’s recommendation of A Random Walk Down Wall Street highlights the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the idea that it is nearly impossible to “beat the market” consistently through luck.

• The Research Perspective: Recent 2025 financial literacy studies in Taiwan show that while basic financial knowledge (like earning income) is high among students, “deeper concepts” like compound interest and long-term risk management are under-explored (Although 83% of Taiwanese students aged 15–18 now own financial accounts, only 35% feel confident in actually using financial services).5 Lin’s advice to start with “small investment experiments” aligns with the “learning by doing” model now being advocated by the FSC to build risk resilience in young adults.

  

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4. Leadership: Alignment Over Ambition

For Lin, leadership is less about titles and more about the alignment of goals and strengths. He believes effort is wasted if it isn’t directed toward meaningful work and protecting value.

His Insight: “Protecting capital and creating value must be prioritized over immediate results or personal titles.”

Insight: Purpose-Driven Leadership

This reflects a global shift in corporate governance toward ESG and Sustainable Investing, which M&G has pioneered in Europe. Lin’s focus on “alignment with meaningful work” suggests that a leader’s role is to ensure the institution’s long-term survival and societal value, rather than meeting quarterly targets through high-risk maneuvers.

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Conclusion: The Farmer’s Harvest

Chairman Lin Chang-Chung’s legacy at M&G Taiwan is a testament to the power of the “Farmer” mindset. In a world of hunters, the one who understands the soil, respects the seasons, and protects the seeds is the one who ultimately sees the most bountiful harvest.

第 4 節說明，台灣的生產力成長並未完全轉化為薪資上升、物價提高或匯率轉強。第 5 節進一步說明，這些成長成果實際流向了哪裡。答案很簡單：流向海外。台灣被壓抑的調整機制，最清楚地反映在其異常龐大的經常帳順差上。

5.1 經常帳實際衡量的是什麼

經常帳用來衡量一個國家：

從商品與服務出口中獲得的收入
加上海外投資所產生的所得
減去進口支出與對外支付的所得

當一個國家出現經常帳順差時，代表該國的生產多於自身消費，儲蓄高於國內投資需求。

這些多餘的儲蓄必須以某種形式投資到海外。

5.2 台灣的順差規模極為異常

近年來，台灣的經常帳順差已達到極端水準，約占 GDP 的 15 至 16%。

作為比較：

德國與日本雖常被批評順差過大，但通常落在 GDP 的 3 至 8%
中國的順差約為 GDP 的 3%
台灣的比例約為其兩倍甚至三倍

單就商品貿易而言，截至 2025 年底，台灣的商品貿易順差年化後約達 GDP 的 31%，主要由全球科技與 AI 熱潮所推動。

這些數據顯示出一個明顯的失衡現象：台灣的經濟體系出口遠多於其人口實際消費。

5.3 為何被低估的匯率至關重要

在理論上，如此龐大的順差應會啟動自動修正機制。

正常情況下：

出口強勁會增加對本國貨幣的需求
貨幣隨之升值
出口價格變得較高
進口價格變得較低
國內消費增加
順差逐步縮小

然而在台灣，這種修正並未發生。

由於新台幣被政策性地阻止升值，出口持續維持高度競爭力，進口價格依然偏高，消費維持疲弱，順差因而持續擴大。

從經濟角度來看，被低估的匯率等同於對出口商的補貼，同時也是對家庭與消費者施加的隱性稅負。這有助於解釋，為何台灣的私人消費占 GDP 的比重在過去二十年間大幅下滑。

5.4 儲蓄過剩所扮演的角色

如此規模的順差，意味著台灣的儲蓄遠超過國內可有效吸收的投資需求。

這些過剩儲蓄主要體現在：

購買外國債券
投資海外股票
大量持有美國國債

因此，台灣的外匯存底已超過 6,000 億美元，而台灣的人壽保險公司則持有接近 1 兆美元的海外資產。

從資產負債表的角度來看，台灣已成為全球重要的淨債權國。

這在表面上看似正面，但同時也伴隨著風險。

5.5 將順差「回收」到海外所帶來的金融曝險

當儲蓄大量投向海外時，便暴露於多重外部風險之下，包括匯率變動、海外利率變化，以及全球金融市場的波動。

若新台幣顯著升值，海外資產以新台幣計價的價值將下降，保險業與金融機構可能承受資產負債表損失，政府與外匯相關的財政收入也會隨之減少。

這形成一種矛盾局面：龐大的順差強化了台灣的對外財務地位，卻同時讓經濟體系更加依賴弱勢匯率，因為匯率升值反而會損害國內金融穩定。

這種回饋循環正是「台灣病」的重要組成部分。

5.6 國際壓力與外交風險

如此龐大的順差很少不引起國際關注。

美國財政部將台灣列入「匯率政策觀察名單」，主要原因包括台灣對美雙邊貿易順差龐大，以及經常帳順差明顯高於 GDP 的 3%。

台灣並未被正式認定為匯率操縱國，台灣官員也一再強調，美方從未正式要求新台幣升值。然而，訊號已相當清楚：台灣的對外失衡正受到密切審視。

截至 2025 年，台灣對美國的貿易順差已超過 1,200 億美元，其中約 95% 來自科技與 AI 供應鏈。這種高度集中，使台灣在貿易緊張與產業政策升溫的國際環境下，更具政治敏感性。

5.7 為何這是結構性問題，而非單純貿易問題

值得強調的是，經常帳順差並不僅是競爭力強勁的象徵。

它同時反映了：

國內消費疲弱
薪資長期受到壓抑
人口老化提高儲蓄傾向
科技產業以外的投資機會有限
政策結構偏向出口而非家庭

部分分析指出，台灣企業在海外，特別是在中國所獲得的利潤，並未完全匯回國內，進一步放大了經常帳順差的統計數字。即便如此，多數共識仍認為，台灣的順差水準遠高於健康範圍。

5.8 為何經濟學者對長期順差感到憂慮

歷史經驗顯示，規模龐大且長期存在的順差，通常只會以兩種方式結束。

第一種是透過薪資上升、消費增加與匯率逐步升值進行漸進式調整。
第二種則是因金融危機、政治壓力或外部衝擊而出現急遽修正。

多數經濟學者認為，台灣應力求前者。

若調整持續延後，金融風險將持續累積，住房負擔與不平等問題惡化，台灣也可能重蹈過去其他順差經濟體延誤改革的覆轍。

6. 類比與歷史教訓：荷蘭病與日本的經驗

在理解台灣經濟運作的機制之後，下一個問題不再是「發生了什麼」，而是「該如何解讀」。台灣是否正經歷某種形式的荷蘭病，如《經濟學人》所暗示？還是正面臨另一種不同的風險？為了回答這個問題，經濟學者經常借助歷史類比，特別是典型的荷蘭病案例，以及日本在 1985 年之後的經驗。

6.1 典型的荷蘭病是什麼

傳統的荷蘭病通常出現在某一出口部門突然大幅擴張的情況下，最常見於石油或天然氣等資源型產業。其運作鏈條一般如下：出口繁榮帶來大量外匯流入，推升本國貨幣快速升值；貨幣升值削弱其他出口產業的競爭力；製造業與可貿易部門逐步萎縮；整體經濟對單一產業的依賴程度加深。簡言之，強勢貨幣最終排擠了其他產業。

這正是台灣長期以來試圖避免的情境。

6.2 為何台灣並非典型的荷蘭病案例

許多台灣經濟學者認為，台灣並不符合教科書式的荷蘭病特徵，原因有數點。首先，台灣的主導產業是半導體，而非資源出口。晶片製造高度仰賴進口設備、材料與技術，供應鏈橫跨美國、日本與歐洲。當台灣出口更多晶片時，也同步增加大量進口，這削弱了資源型出口對匯率所造成的單向壓力。

其次，台灣匯率的變動更多受到資本流動而非貿易流動影響。全球投資人對台灣股市，尤其是大型科技股的買賣，往往比出口收入更能左右新台幣走勢。這使台灣的情況在結構上與典型的荷蘭病有所不同。

第三，許多傳統產業在科技繁榮之前便已承受壓力，原因包括來自中國的競爭、設備老化與生產力落差。它們並非被匯率升值所擠出市場，相反地，偏弱的新台幣反而延長了它們的存續時間。因此，將台灣的問題單純歸因於匯率，容易忽略更深層的結構因素。

6.3 台灣真正擔心的風險

具有諷刺意味的是，台灣政策制定者真正擔心的並不是匯率升值所引發的荷蘭病，而是其反面情境。許多專家警告，若新台幣突然大幅升值，結果可能更接近一種延後發作的衝擊。

在這種情況下，像台積電這樣的高端企業很可能仍能存活，但鋼鐵、汽車零組件、紡織與機械等傳統出口產業則可能迅速喪失競爭力，導致失業率在仍高度依賴這些產業的部門中攀升。

目前，電子產業雖佔台灣 GDP 的三分之一以上，卻僅吸納不到三分之一的製造業就業人口。這意味著多數工廠勞工仍集中在利潤較低的產業，一旦匯率快速升值，衝擊將集中落在這些族群身上。這也是政策制定者抗拒快速調整的重要原因。

6.4 日本廣場協議與停滯的陰影

對台灣而言，最具警示性的歷史類比來自日本。1985 年，在美國施壓下，日本簽署廣場協議，被迫讓日圓大幅升值，以縮小其對外貿易順差。隨後，日圓快速升值，日本央行為保護出口商而大幅降息，寬鬆的貨幣環境推動股市與房市泡沫急速膨脹。當泡沫破裂後，日本進入長期停滯。

許多台灣經濟學者將此視為警告。他們認為，強制升值或許能修正貿易失衡，卻同時可能破壞金融穩定、引發資產價格崩跌，並將經濟鎖入長期低成長。一些專家甚至明言，若台灣今日重演類似情境，可能面臨長達三、四十年的停滯風險。

從這個角度看，《經濟學人》所暗示的匯率升值路徑，並非毫無風險，甚至可能是治標卻傷及根本。

6.5 令人不安的相似之處

台灣與日本在進入停滯前，確實共享若干結構特徵，包括人口快速老化、低出生率、高儲蓄率、內需疲弱以及對出口的高度依賴。老化社會傾向於儲蓄多於消費，自然會產生經常帳順差，這意味著台灣的失衡並非完全由政策造成，而部分源自人口結構。

日本的問題不僅在於匯率升值，更在於結構改革的延宕。銀行體系遲遲未處理不良資產，效率低落的企業被長期保留，核心產業之外的生產力提升有限。台灣的情況尚未如此嚴重，但經濟學者擔心，若政策持續停滯，可能出現一種較慢、較隱性的相似結果。

6.6 走在狹窄的路徑上

綜合歷史類比，台灣正處於一個困難的抉擇之中。它試圖同時避免三種風險：因過度升值而產生的荷蘭病，因被迫調整而導致的日本式停滯，以及因持續不作為而累積的內部失衡。

因此，台灣選擇了一條狹窄的路徑：緩慢調整、優先保障就業、逐步改革結構性弱點，並在不引發危機的前提下改善生活水準。這樣的平衡，也解釋了為何政策行動顯得謹慎，且劇烈改革在政治上難以推動。

7. 結構性問題的核心：資產泡沫、不平等與高度集中

在前面的章節中，討論重點放在匯率、對外失衡與歷史類比上。第 7 節將視角進一步轉向經濟體內部。許多經濟學者認為，「台灣病」的根源並不完全存在於匯率本身，而是深層的結構性扭曲。從這個角度來看，匯率更像是一面反映問題的鏡子，而非問題的起點。

7.1 房市：結構性泡沫，而非單純的貨幣現象

住房是一般民眾最直接感受到的壓力來源。長期低利率確實降低了借貸成本，但這並不足以解釋台灣房價為何走向極端。更關鍵的因素在於稅制與制度設計。

台灣長期存在低持有稅、對空屋懲罰不足、持有多戶住宅成本偏低等問題。這些制度誘因使得投資者可以低成本持有房產，等待價格上漲，而不必承擔明顯的財務壓力。結果是住宅逐漸從居住需求轉為資產配置工具。

一些經濟學者指出，日本同樣長期維持近零利率，卻未在近年出現類似的房市飆漲。其中一個關鍵差異在於，日本的房產持有稅較高，人口呈現下降趨勢，且對房價長期上漲的預期較弱。相較之下，台灣的問題並非只是資金便宜，而是「持有成本過低」。

因此，單靠升息或讓新台幣升值，並不足以根本改善住房可負擔性。若缺乏稅制改革，投機行為仍可能持續。

7.2 薪資停滯與勞動分配惡化

另一個關鍵結構問題是長期的薪資停滯。自 1990 年代起，許多台灣企業將製造據點外移至中國與東南亞，削弱了國內對中階勞動力的需求。隨著時間推移，勞動在國民所得中的占比持續下降，資本所得占比則不斷上升。

高所得家庭與企業往往有較高的儲蓄傾向，而非消費傾向，這進一步壓抑內需，並放大經常帳順差。部分台灣經濟學者因此指出，即便匯率升值，若勞動談判力未改善、非科技部門生產力未提升，薪資也不一定會出現實質成長。

這也是近年政策討論中，政府逐步將注意力轉向提高公部門薪資的原因。透過提高教師、公務員與軍人的待遇，政府希望發揮「薪資示範效果」，促使民間企業跟進。然而，在產業結構高度分化的情況下，這樣的效果仍存在侷限。

7.3 產業過度集中與「雙軌經濟」

台灣經濟結構正呈現高度集中趨勢。高科技產業，尤其是半導體，已占 GDP 的三分之一以上，主導出口成長，並構成對美貿易順差的主要來源。然而，這些產業吸納的就業人口比例卻遠低於其經濟占比。

這形成一種被稱為「雙軌經濟」的現象。一方面是具有全球競爭力、高附加價值與高利潤的科技企業；另一方面則是利潤微薄、議價能力弱、對成本高度敏感的傳統產業。

這種結構使政策制定變得困難。對科技企業而言，較強的新台幣或較高的利率未必構成致命威脅；但對傳統出口產業來說，這樣的調整可能直接影響生存。同樣的分裂也出現在貨幣政策上，資金充裕的企業希望資產降溫，而負債較高的企業則仰賴低利率維持營運。

結果是，單一政策工具難以同時滿足兩種經濟軌道的需求。

7.4 多重政策陷阱

部分分析者將台灣目前的狀況形容為「多重政策陷阱」，意指多項政策彼此強化，使得調整成本不斷上升。

這個循環大致如下：政府補貼壓低生活成本，低生活成本被用來合理化偏低的薪資水準，低薪資支撐出口競爭力，出口依賴促使匯率干預與低利率政策持續，低利率推升房地產與資產價格，而資產增值的主要受益者又集中在年長與既有資產階層，進一步擴大不平等。

在這樣的結構下，任何單點調整都可能引發連鎖反應。正因如此，有評論認為中央銀行已不再是完全自由的決策者。大幅政策轉向可能導致房市修正、保險業承壓、傳統產業倒閉，甚至失業上升。

這套系統在表面上穩定，但內部卻高度脆弱。

7.5 為何結構改革如此困難

結構改革遲滯，並非缺乏認知，而是政治與經濟現實的結果。房產持有者受益於價格上升，出口商仰賴弱勢匯率，金融機構從既有配置中獲利，而選民往往將穩定視為治理能力的象徵。在經濟仍能維持成長的情況下，改革動能自然有限。

然而，改革延後的代價在於，未來的調整可能不再由政策主導，而是由市場、人口結構或地緣政治壓力所迫。這正是第 7 節試圖凸顯的核心風險。

8. 政策回應與調整的極限

在前述章節中可以看出，「台灣病」的形成並非單一政策錯誤，而是多重選擇累積的結果。第 8 節關注的是，面對這些壓力，台灣實際上採取了哪些政策回應，以及為何調整至今仍顯得緩慢、謹慎且高度有限。整體而言，台灣的策略並非全面改革，而是以風險管理為核心的漸進式應對。

8.1 中央銀行的基本立場：穩定優先於修正

台灣中央銀行並未採取新的匯率制度，也未明確設定新台幣的長期升值路徑。相反地，其政策核心仍是穩定與漸進。

目前的政策特徵包括，容許有限的雙向匯率波動，在市場出現快速升值壓力時進行干預，使利率大致與美國保持同步，並將金融穩定置於外部再平衡之上。這種立場並非否認失衡的存在，而是基於判斷，認為快速修正所帶來的成本可能高於持續管理的風險。

在實務上，這意味著中央銀行的角色更接近於抑制波動，而非引導匯率走向新的均衡水準。

8.2 管理金融風險，而非根本消除

在金融層面，政策重點放在降低極端風險，而非重塑資金配置結構。政府並未試圖大幅縮減海外資產配置，而是強化緩衝機制。

具體作法包括，提高保險業的資本適足率要求，要求保險公司加強匯率風險避險，調整會計與監理規則，以及加強對外幣資產期限錯配的監督。這些措施有助於降低突發性衝擊對金融體系的傷害，但並未改變儲蓄持續外流、匯率錯配依然存在的結構性事實。

8.3 房市政策：降溫而非重置

在房市方面，政府已推出多項措施，但多集中於抑制短期投機，而非處理根本制度問題。政策工具主要包括，限制房貸成數，提高短期交易的稅負，以及針對多戶持有者實施選擇性信用管制。

然而，最具影響力的工具，也就是全面性的持有稅調整、對空屋的實質懲罰，以及土地稅制改革，至今仍未成為政策核心。結果是，房市交易動能或許放緩，但價格水準仍維持高檔，尤其在台北等都會區更為明顯。房市政策的重點在於控制速度，而非回復可負擔性。

8.4 以薪資政策取代匯率調整

由於內需疲弱逐漸成為共識，政策討論近年轉向透過薪資而非匯率來促進消費。政府開始逐步調升基本工資，提高公部門薪資，並鼓勵企業分享部分生產力成果。

這種做法試圖修補先前被阻斷的傳導機制，讓家庭所得直接改善，而不必承擔匯率快速調整的衝擊。然而，在產業生產力高度分化、勞動談判力有限的情況下，薪資成長仍集中於科技部門，對整體內需的拉動效果存在限制。

8.5 以產業政策進行內部再平衡

相較於宏觀調整，台灣更傾向透過產業政策進行「內部修補」。政策方向包括，協助傳統製造業升級，推動自動化與數位轉型，擴大國內投資機會，以及降低對單一出口部門的依賴。

這反映出一種政策信念，即與其透過匯率壓縮經濟，不如透過提升整體生產力來擴大調整空間。然而，產業升級本身需要時間，且短期內難以吸收過剩儲蓄或快速改善內需結構。

8.6 為何改革始終維持漸進

政策調整之所以緩慢，並非缺乏問題意識，而是受制於現實限制。出口產業擔憂利潤壓縮，房產持有者反對稅制改革，金融機構受益於現有配置，選民則將穩定視為治理能力的重要指標。此外，地緣政治風險的存在，也提高了政策試驗的成本。

在經濟仍能維持成長的前提下，政策制定者更傾向於選擇可控的不平衡，而非承擔不可預期的修正風險。

9. 前瞻與意義：調整的時間點，而非方向

綜合前述分析可以看出，「台灣病」並非一場即將爆發的危機，而是一種在成功中逐步累積的結構性張力。台灣的經濟基本面依然強健，出口競爭力真實存在，產業優勢仍在擴大，但成長的傳導機制並未同步運作。生產力持續上升，卻未能全面轉化為薪資成長、內需擴張與生活水準的改善，這正是問題的核心。

從政策角度來看，台灣並非沒有選擇，而是選擇了延後。透過匯率管理、金融緩衝與漸進式調整，台灣成功避免了短期震盪，也維持了就業與金融穩定。然而，這種策略的代價在於，調整壓力並未消失，而是隨時間累積，逐漸轉化為房市負擔、世代差距與對外曝險的擴大。

因此，真正的分歧點不在於「是否需要調整」，而在於「由誰、在何時、以何種速度進行調整」。若調整能在仍具政策主動權的情況下展開，透過薪資、稅制、產業結構與內需擴張逐步修復傳導機制，成本將相對可控。反之，若調整被一再延後，未來更可能在市場壓力、人口變化或地緣政治衝擊下被迫進行，屆時的代價將更為集中且難以管理。

對一般高中生而言，這場討論並非抽象的宏觀辯論，而是與未來生活路徑直接相關的問題。它關係到薪資是否能追上生活成本，住房是否仍有可及性，以及努力是否仍能帶來向上的流動性。台灣的經濟或許仍會在數據上持續成功，但真正決定未來世代感受的，將是成長是否能被有效地傳遞，而不只是被累積。

資料來源：

《經濟學人》。〈台灣經濟繁榮背後的隱藏風險〉。《經濟學人》，2025 年 11 月。

《經濟學人》。〈台灣驚人的經濟成就正產生令人憂慮的壓力〉。《經濟學人》，2025 年 11 月。

《Focus Taiwan》。〈《經濟學人》提出的「台灣病」說法引發反彈〉，2025 年 11 月 23 日。
https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202511230013

中華經濟研究院。〈台灣真的「生病」了嗎？升值迷思背後的政策困境〉，CIER，2025 年。
https://www.cier.edu.tw/en/institution-en/29569/

魏迪諾（Dino Wei）。〈台灣並未陷入荷蘭病陷阱〉。《台北時報》，2025 年 11 月 24 日。
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2025/11/24/2003847712

《Taiwan Current News》。〈專家指出，《經濟學人》對台灣匯率低估問題開錯藥方〉，2025 年。
https://www.tcn.tw/news/6756013

《The Print》。〈印度不應複製台灣的匯率政策模式〉，2025 年。
https://theprint.in/opinion/economix/taiwan-currency-policy/2791270/

《台北時報》。〈經濟學家預期央行將維持利率不變〉，2025 年 12 月 16 日。
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2025/12/16/2003848940

內政部（台灣）。〈住宅負擔能力與房價所得比統計資料〉，中華民國政府，2025 年，轉引自 Taiwan Current News。

中華民國中央銀行。〈有關匯率政策與金融穩定之相關說明〉，2025 年，轉引自 Focus Taiwan 與《台北時報》。

美國財政部。〈美國與台灣就匯率實務發表之聯合聲明〉，2025 年 11 月。

圖片來源：

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作者：Nathan S.

Section 4 showed that Taiwan’s productivity gains did not fully translate into higher wages, prices, or a stronger currency. Section 5 explains where those gains went instead. The answer is simple: abroad. Taiwan’s suppressed adjustment shows up most clearly in its extraordinarily large current account surplus.

5.1 What the Current Account Actually Measures

The current account tracks how much a country:

• earns from exports of goods and services

• plus income from overseas investments

• minus what it spends on imports and foreign income payments

If a country runs a current account surplus, it means:

the country produces more than it consumes, and saves more than it invests domestically.

That excess must be invested abroad.

5.2 Taiwan’s Surplus Is Exceptionally Large

In recent years, Taiwan’s current account surplus has reached extreme levels, around 15–16% of GDP.

For comparison:

• Germany and Japan, often criticized for large surpluses, usually sit between 3–8% of GDP

• China’s surplus is around 3% of GDP

• Taiwan’s is roughly double or triple these levels

Taiwan’s goods trade surplus alone reached about 31% of GDP (annualized) by late 2025, driven largely by the global tech and AI boom.

These numbers indicate a major imbalance:
Taiwan’s economy exports far more than its population consumes.

5.3 Why the Undervalued Currency Matters

In theory, such a large surplus should trigger automatic correction.

Normally:

• strong exports increase demand for the currency

• the currency appreciates

• exports become more expensive

• imports become cheaper

• domestic consumption rises

• the surplus shrinks

In Taiwan, this correction did not happen.

Because the NT$ was actively prevented from appreciating:

• exports remained extremely competitive

• imports stayed expensive

• consumption remained weak

• and the surplus kept growing

Economically, the undervalued currency acts like:

• a subsidy to exporters, and

• a tax on households.

This helps explain why private consumption’s share of GDP collapsed over the past two decades.

5.4 The Role of Excess Savings

A surplus of this size means Taiwan saves far more than it can productively use at home.

That excess saving shows up as:

• purchases of foreign bonds

• overseas equities

• and large holdings of U.S. Treasury securities

This is why:

• Taiwan’s foreign exchange reserves exceed US$600 billion

• Taiwanese life insurers hold close to US$1 trillion in foreign assets

From a balance-sheet perspective, Taiwan has become a major global creditor.

This sounds positive, but it carries risks.

5.5 Financial Exposure from Recycling the Surplus

When savings are invested abroad, they are exposed to:

• exchange rate movements

• foreign interest rate changes

• and global financial volatility

If the NT$ strengthens significantly:

• foreign assets lose value in NT$ terms

• insurers and financial institutions suffer balance-sheet losses

• government fiscal revenue tied to FX profits declines

This creates a paradox:

• the surplus strengthens Taiwan’s external position

• but it also locks the economy into dependence on a weak currency, because appreciation would damage domestic financial stability

This feedback loop is a key part of the “Taiwan disease.”

5.6 International Pressure and Diplomatic Risk

Such large surpluses rarely go unnoticed.

The U.S. Treasury has placed Taiwan on its Currency Monitoring List due to:

• a large bilateral trade surplus with the U.S.

• and a current account surplus well above 3% of GDP

Taiwan has not been officially labeled a currency manipulator, and Taiwanese officials emphasize that the U.S. has never formally demanded appreciation. Still, the message is clear:
Taiwan’s imbalances are under international scrutiny.

By 2025, Taiwan’s trade surplus with the U.S. exceeded US$120 billion, with roughly 95% coming from the tech and AI supply chain. This concentration increases political sensitivity, especially in an era of trade tensions and industrial policy.

5.7 Why This Is a Structural Problem, Not Just a Trade Issue

Importantly, the surplus is not just a sign of competitiveness.

It reflects:

• weak domestic consumption

• suppressed wages

• an aging population that saves more

• limited domestic investment opportunities outside tech

• and policies that favor exports over households

Some analysts note that part of the surplus comes from profits Taiwanese firms earn abroad, especially in China, that are not fully repatriated. This inflates surplus figures. Even so, the consensus remains that Taiwan’s surplus is far above healthy levels.

5.8 Why Economists Worry About Persistent Surpluses

History shows that very large surpluses usually end in one of two ways:

1. Gradual adjustment, through rising wages, consumption, and currency appreciation

2. Abrupt correction, caused by financial crisis, political pressure, or external shocks

Most economists argue Taiwan should aim for the first.

Without adjustment:

• financial risks continue to build

• housing and inequality worsen

• and Taiwan risks repeating the mistakes of past surplus economies that delayed reform too long

5.9 Transition to the Next Section

Section 5 shows that the “Taiwan disease” is about how blocked domestic adjustment turns productivity into foreign savings instead of higher living standards.

The next question is historical and comparative:

• Is Taiwan experiencing a modern version of Dutch disease?

• Or is it closer to Japan’s experience after forced currency appreciation?

6. Analogies and Historical Lessons: Dutch Disease and Japan’s Experience

By this point, the economic mechanics are clear. The remaining question is how to interpret them. Is Taiwan suffering from something like Dutch disease, as The Economist suggests? Or is it facing a different kind of risk altogether? To answer that, economists turn to historical comparisons, especially Dutch disease and Japan’s post-1985 experience.

6.1 What Dutch Disease Usually Means

Classic Dutch disease happens when a country experiences a sudden boom in one export sector, often natural resources like oil or gas.

The usual chain looks like this:

• export boom brings in large foreign currency inflows,

• the domestic currency appreciates sharply,

• other export industries become less competitive,

• manufacturing and tradable sectors shrink,

• the economy becomes over-dependent on one sector.

In short, a strong currency ends up crowding out other industries.

This is what Taiwan has tried very hard to avoid.

6.2 Why Taiwan Is Not a Textbook Dutch Disease Case

Many Taiwanese economists argue that Taiwan does not fit the classic Dutch disease pattern, for several reasons.

First, Taiwan’s dominant industry, semiconductors, is not like oil or gas. Chip production is:

• highly import-intensive, relying on machinery, equipment, and materials from the U.S., Japan, and Europe

• deeply embedded in global supply chains

When Taiwan exports more chips, it also imports more equipment and inputs. This reduces the one-way pressure on the exchange rate that resource booms usually create.

Second, Taiwan’s currency movements are driven more by capital flows than trade flows. Global investors buying and selling Taiwanese stocks affect the NT$ more than export revenues do. This makes Taiwan’s situation structurally different from resource-driven Dutch disease.

Third, many of Taiwan’s traditional sectors were already under pressure before the tech boom, due to:

• competition from China

• aging factories

• productivity gaps

They were not pushed out by an appreciating currency. If anything, the weak NT$ helped them survive longer.

Because of this, some analysts argue that blaming Taiwan’s problems on exchange rates alone is too simplistic. The exchange rate, in their words, is more of a mirror reflecting deeper structural issues.

6.3 The Risk Taiwan Is Actually Worried About

Ironically, Taiwan’s fear is not Dutch disease from appreciation. It is the opposite.

Taiwanese experts warn that if the NT$ were to appreciate suddenly, the outcome could resemble a delayed Dutch disease shock:

• advanced firms like TSMC would likely survive

• but traditional exporters such as steel, auto parts, textiles, and machinery could collapse

• unemployment could surge in sectors that still employ a large share of workers

Electronics now account for over one-third of GDP, but less than one-third of manufacturing employment. That means most factory workers are still in lower-margin industries. A sharp currency rise would hit them hardest.

6.4 Japan’s Plaza Accord and the Fear of Stagnation

The most powerful historical analogy for Taiwan is Japan in the late 1980s.

In 1985, under U.S. pressure, Japan agreed to the Plaza Accord, which forced the yen to appreciate sharply to reduce Japan’s trade surplus. The consequences were severe:

• the yen rose very quickly

• the Bank of Japan cut interest rates to protect exporters

• easy money fueled massive asset bubbles in stocks and real estate

• when the bubbles burst, Japan entered decades of stagnation

Taiwanese economists see this as a warning.

They argue that:

• forcing appreciation can cure trade imbalances

• but it can also destabilize financial systems

• trigger asset crashes

• and lock an economy into long-term low growth

Some experts explicitly warn that if Taiwan were pushed into a similar adjustment today, it could face “thirty to forty years of stagnation.”

From this perspective, The Economist’s recommendation to strengthen the currency looks dangerous. It may cure the symptom, but damage the patient.

6.5 Similarities That Make the Japan Comparison Uncomfortable

Taiwan shares several structural traits with Japan before its lost decade:

• an aging population

• very low birth rates

• high savings rates

• weak domestic consumption

• heavy reliance on exports

Aging societies tend to save more and spend less, which naturally produces current account surpluses. This means Taiwan’s imbalance is not just policy-driven. It is also demographic.

Japan’s mistake was not only appreciation. It was delayed structural reform:

• banks were slow to deal with bad loans

• inefficient firms were kept alive

• productivity outside core industries lagged

Taiwan’s situation is not as severe, but economists worry that policy inertia could produce a slower, quieter version of the same outcome.

6.6 Walking a Narrow Path

Taken together, the historical analogies point to a dilemma.

Taiwan wants to avoid:

• Dutch disease from over-appreciation

• Japan-style stagnation from forced adjustment

• and continued internal imbalance from doing nothing

This leaves Taiwan walking a narrow path:

• adjust slowly

• protect employment

• reform structural weaknesses

• and raise domestic living standards without triggering crisis

That balancing act explains why policymakers move cautiously and why dramatic solutions are politically unpopular.

7. Underlying Structural Issues: Bubbles, Inequality, and Concentration

Up to now, the discussion has focused on exchange rates, trade balances, and historical comparisons. Section 7 shifts the lens inward. Many economists argue that the real problem behind the “Taiwan disease” is not the currency itself, but deep structural distortions inside Taiwan’s economy. In this view, the exchange rate is more of a symptom than a cause.

7.1 Housing: Why the Bubble Is Structural, Not Just Monetary

Housing is the most visible pressure point for ordinary people.

Low interest rates made borrowing cheap, but that alone does not explain why Taiwan’s housing market became so extreme. The bigger issue lies in tax policy.

Taiwan has:

• very low property holding taxes

• weak penalties for vacant homes

• limited costs for owning multiple properties

This creates strong incentives for speculation. Investors can buy homes, leave them empty, and wait for prices to rise with almost no tax downside.

Several economists point out an important comparison. Japan has had near-zero interest rates for decades, yet did not experience a similar housing surge in recent years. One major reason is that Japan has:

• higher property taxes

• a shrinking population

• weaker expectations of long-term price appreciation

In Taiwan, the housing crisis is therefore about cheap ownership. Low rates provided the spark, but the tax system provided the fuel.

This means that simply raising interest rates or letting the NT$ appreciate would not automatically fix housing affordability. Without tax reform, speculation would likely continue.

7.2 Wage Stagnation and the Labor Share Problem

Another core structural issue is long-term wage stagnation.

Since the 1990s, many Taiwanese firms moved manufacturing to China and Southeast Asia. This reduced demand for domestic labor, especially mid-skill jobs. Over time:

• labor’s share of GDP fell from about 55% to below 50%

• capital captured a growing share of national income

Higher-income households and corporations tend to save more, not spend more. This reinforces:

• weak domestic consumption

• large current account surpluses

Some Taiwanese economists argue that focusing on currency appreciation misses this deeper problem. Even if the NT$ strengthened, wages would not necessarily rise unless labor bargaining power, productivity outside tech, and public wage benchmarks improved.

This is why policymakers have begun discussing:

• raising public-sector pay for teachers, soldiers, and civil servants

• using the government as a wage leader to pressure private firms to follow

The logic is simple: without stronger wages, consumption cannot rise sustainably.

7.3 Industrial Over-Concentration and the “Two Economies” Problem

Taiwan’s economy has become highly concentrated.

High-tech sectors, especially semiconductors, now account for:

• over one-third of GDP

• the majority of export growth

• nearly all of the trade surplus with the United States

But these sectors employ less than one-third of manufacturing workers.

This creates what some analysts call a two-track economy:

• one track consists of globally competitive, high-margin tech firms

• the other consists of traditional industries with thin margins and weak pricing power

This matters for policy. A stronger NT$ would:

• barely affect firms like TSMC, which compete on technology, not price

• but severely hurt traditional exporters that rely on cost competitiveness

The same split appears in interest rate policy. Cash-rich tech firms might prefer higher rates to cool asset bubbles. Debt-heavy traditional firms need low rates to survive.

As a result, one set of policies cannot easily serve both economies at once.

8. Policy Responses and the Limits of Adjustment

This section focuses on what Taiwan has actually done in response to the pressures identified earlier and why meaningful adjustment has been slow cautious and partial. Rather than a single reform Taiwan’s response has taken the form of incremental management aimed at reducing risk without breaking the existing system.

8.1 Central bank posture: stability over correction

Taiwan’s central bank has not adopted a new exchange rate regime Instead it has doubled down on gradualism:

Key features of the approach

• tolerate limited two way currency movement

• intervene to prevent rapid appreciation

• keep interest rates broadly aligned with the United States

• emphasize financial stability over external rebalancing

The logic is defensive. Policymakers accept that imbalances exist but judge that abrupt correction would be more damaging than continued management. In practice, this means smoothing volatility rather than steering the NT dollar toward a higher long run level.

8.2 Managing financial risk rather than eliminating it

Rather than unwind overseas exposure Taiwan has focused on risk containment.

Examples include:

• tighter capital adequacy requirements for insurers

• pressure on insurers to hedge currency exposure

• incremental adjustments to accounting rules

• closer supervision of foreign asset duration mismatches

These steps reduce tail risk but do not change the underlying structure. Excess savings still flow abroad and currency mismatch still exists just with thicker buffers.

8.3 Housing measures without structural tax reform

The government has introduced housing policies but largely avoided the most powerful lever property taxation.

Actions taken:

• limits on mortgage loan to value ratios

• higher transaction taxes on short term flipping

• selective credit controls on multiple home buyers

Actions avoided:

• meaningful increases in annual property holding taxes

• strong penalties for vacant housing

• comprehensive land value taxation

As a result speculation has slowed at the margin but price levels remain high especially in Taipei. Housing policy has focused on cooling momentum not resetting affordability.

8.4 Wage policy as a substitute for currency adjustment

Recognizing that consumption is weak, policymakers have increasingly turned to wages rather than exchange rates.

Recent emphasis includes:

• raising minimum wages gradually

• increasing public sector pay for civil servants teachers and military personnel

• encouraging firms to share productivity gains with workers

The idea is to boost household income directly without relying on currency appreciation. This approach treats wages as the transmission mechanism that was previously blocked.

However, without stronger productivity growth outside tech and without bargaining power shifts, wage gains risk remaining uneven.

8.5 Industrial policy to rebalance from within

Taiwan’s preferred adjustment channel is industrial upgrading.

Policy focus areas:

• moving traditional manufacturers up the value chain

• supporting automation and digitization

• expanding domestic investment opportunities

• reducing overreliance on a single export sector

This reflects a belief that the safest path is to raise competitiveness everywhere rather than compress the economy through currency pressure.

8.6 The Multi-Policy Trap

The slow pace of reform reflects real constraints.

Political and economic limits:

• exporters fear margin collapse

• homeowners resist tax reform

• financial institutions benefit from the status quo

• voters associate stability with competence

• geopolitical risk raises the cost of experimentation

As long as growth continues even unevenly policymakers prefer controlled imbalance over disruptive correction.

Looking forward, the Taiwan disease matters because Taiwan’s economic success is no longer reaching everyone evenly. For high school students, this appears in concrete ways: housing that feels permanently out of reach, wages that lag behind living costs, and a future where effort does not reliably translate into upward mobility. Taiwan’s economy will likely remain strong on paper, yet meaningful progress depends on whether growth reaches wages, housing access, and opportunity. The core lesson is that the path growth takes through an economy shapes everyday lives as much as the pace of growth itself.

Sources:

The Economist. “The Hidden Risks in Taiwan’s Boom.” The Economist, Nov. 2025.

The Economist. “Taiwan’s Amazing Economic Achievements Are Yielding Alarming Strains.” The Economist, Nov. 2025.

Focus Taiwan. “The Economist’s ‘Taiwan Disease’ Claim Sparks Pushback.” Focus Taiwan, 23 Nov. 2025,
https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202511230013.

Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. Is Taiwan Really ‘Sick’? The Policy Dilemma Behind the Appreciation Myth. CIER, 2025,
https://www.cier.edu.tw/en/institution-en/29569/.

Wei, Dino. “The Nation Is Not under the Dutch Disease Trap.” Taipei Times, 24 Nov. 2025,
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2025/11/24/2003847712.

Taiwan Current News. “The Economist Prescribed the Wrong Cure for Taiwan’s Undervalued Currency, Say Experts.” Taiwan Current News, 2025,
https://www.tcn.tw/news/6756013.

The Print. “India Shouldn’t Copy Taiwan’s Currency Playbook.” The Print, 2025,
https://theprint.in/opinion/economix/taiwan-currency-policy/2791270/.

Taipei Times. “Economists Expect Central Bank to Maintain Its Rates.” Taipei Times, 16 Dec. 2025,
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2025/12/16/2003848940.

Taiwan Ministry of the Interior. Housing Affordability and Price-to-Income Statistics. Government of Taiwan, cited via Taiwan Current News, 2025.

Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Statements on Exchange Rate Policy and Financial Stability, cited via Focus Taiwan and Taipei Times, 2025.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. Joint Statement with Taiwan on Exchange Rate Practices. Nov. 2025.

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By: Nathan S.

2025 年 11 月，《經濟學人》首次提出「台灣病」（Taiwanese disease），又稱「福爾摩沙流感」（Formosan flu），用以描述正在台灣這個表面上極為成功的經濟體內部累積的一系列結構性失衡。這個用語本身帶有刻意的挑釁性，明顯呼應經濟學中著名的「荷蘭病」，即某一出口產業過度繁榮，導致本國貨幣大幅升值，進而損害經濟中其他部門。

但台灣的情況並不相同。

與其讓匯率在出口繁榮下自然升值，台灣中央銀行長期刻意壓低新台幣（NT$）的價值。這樣做的政策目標相當明確：

• 維持出口價格低廉

• 保護製造業就業

• 維持全球競爭力，特別是在半導體等高科技產業

在一般的經濟邏輯下，一個國家隨著生產力與收入水準提高，其貨幣理應升值。較強的貨幣能提升國民購買力，並提高國內生活水準。《經濟學人》認為，台灣刻意阻止了這種正常的調整過程，從而形成一種「自我造成」的經濟狀態。

這正是「台灣病」這一說法的核心概念：

台灣成功避免了一個問題，即強勢貨幣對出口造成的壓力，但卻因此製造出另一組結構性問題。

根據《經濟學人》的觀點，這些政策帶來了多項副作用：

• 匯率被低估，無法反映台灣實際的經濟實力

• 消費者購買力受限，因為食品、能源與進口商品價格偏高

• 資產價格大幅上漲，特別是房地產

• 金融風險上升，尤其集中於保險業

• 極端的貿易與經常帳順差，代表台灣生產遠多於自身消費

這一用語主要出現在《經濟學人》的兩篇文章中：

-〈台灣繁榮背後的隱藏風險〉
-〈台灣驚人的經濟成就正在產生令人警惕的壓力〉

兩篇文章皆指出，台灣成功避開了典型的荷蘭病情境，也就是因匯率升值而排擠其他產業。然而，它們同時主張，為了避免這種調整所付出的代價，已在經濟體內部悄然累積。

2.「台灣病」的症狀與特徵

本節整理《經濟學人》及相關分析所指出的「台灣病」具體表現。這些並非抽象的理論推演，而是反映在價格、薪資、住房、儲蓄與金融風險等層面，成為一般民眾即使未使用經濟學語言，也能實際感受到的現象。

2.1 長期被低估的匯率

最核心的症狀，是台灣的貨幣相對於其經濟實力而言異常疲弱。

截至 2025 年底，經 GDP 調整後的「大麥克指數」將新台幣評為全球被低估程度最高的貨幣，估計其相對美元低估約 55%。大麥克指數透過比較各國相同產品的價格，並依所得水準進行調整，以估算實質購買力。

台灣中央銀行對此指標提出質疑，指出：

• 台灣對電力、水、交通等公共事業提供大量補貼

• 這些補貼使國內價格被刻意壓低

• 因此食品與服務看起來比「應有水準」便宜，放大了匯率被低估的視覺效果

即便考慮這些因素，仍存在一個廣泛共識：
台灣的匯率並未隨其經濟成功而相應升值。

在過去二十年間，台灣已成為：

• 亞洲最富裕的經濟體之一

• 全球先進製造的核心領導者

• 半導體與 AI 硬體供應鏈中不可或缺的關鍵角色

然而在同一時期，台灣的實質有效匯率（REER），即考量通膨與主要貿易夥伴後的匯率指標，卻異常平穩。對一個快速成長的高所得經濟體而言，這是反常的，顯示政策反覆介入以阻止升值，而非讓市場力量主導。

2.2 出口依賴與極端的對外順差

弱勢匯率會產生可預期的效果：

• 讓出口對外國買家更便宜

• 使進口對國內消費者更昂貴

在台灣，這導致了異常龐大的貿易與經常帳順差。

在 21 世紀的主要經濟體中，排除石油國與特殊轉口經濟體，台灣的經常帳順差占 GDP 比例為全球最高之一。近年來：

• 經常帳順差約達 GDP 的 16%

• 商品貿易順差在 2025 年底年化後約達 GDP 的 31%

作為對照：

• 中國的順差約為 GDP 的 3%

• 德國與日本通常介於 3% 至 8%

這些數字意味著，台灣的生產遠高於國內消費，而且這種差距並非短期現象，而是隨著內需走弱而持續擴大。

一個特別醒目的指標是，私人消費占 GDP 的比重自 1998 年以來下降了約 20 個百分點。對一個高所得民主國家而言，這樣的跌幅極為罕見，顯示成長越來越依賴出口與投資，而非家庭支出。

在經濟上，被低估的匯率等同於：

• 對生產者的補貼，使其享有出口競爭力

• 對消費者的隱性稅負，使進口食品、能源與電子產品價格偏高

這形成了一個自我強化的循環：

• 消費疲弱 → 貿易順差擴大

• 順差擴大 → 儲蓄過剩

• 儲蓄過剩 → 資金外流，而非在國內使用

  ---

3. 匯率政策與「不可能三角」：Mundell–Fleming 的視角

要理解第二節中出現的各種症狀，必須回到台灣在政策上所做的取捨。經濟學家通常透過「不可能三角」，又稱 Mundell–Fleming 三難困境，來解釋這一點。

3.1 不可能三角的簡要說明

不可能三角指出，一個國家無法同時完全實現以下三項目標：

• 穩定或高度管理的匯率

• 資本自由流動（資金可自由進出國境）

• 獨立的貨幣政策（可依國內需求調整利率）

一個國家最多只能選擇其中兩項，必須放棄第三項。

過去數十年來，台灣的選擇相當明確：

• 台灣允許資本自由流動

• 台灣積極管理匯率，使新台幣保持相對穩定且略偏弱

• 因此，台灣放棄了相當程度的貨幣政策自主性

這個取捨正是「台灣病」的核心制度背景。

3.2 台灣作為小型開放經濟體

台灣是一個典型的小型開放經濟體，意味著：

• 與全球貿易往來高度密切

• 外資進出限制極少

• 金融市場高度暴露於全球情緒與風險變化

外國投資人持有大量台灣股票，特別集中於如台積電等大型科技公司。當全球科技前景樂觀時，資金流入台灣；當地緣政治風險升高或市場轉弱時，資金則迅速流出。

在資本高度自由流動的情況下：

• 台美利差變得極為關鍵

• 即使微小的利率差異，也可能引發大規模資本移動

3.3 為何匯率穩定會限制利率政策

台灣中央銀行長期試圖防止新台幣快速升值，以保護出口產業與製造業就業。

其運作機制如下：

• 若台灣利率顯著高於美國，外資將大量流入以追求較高報酬

• 資金流入會推升新台幣匯率

• 匯率升值將削弱出口競爭力

為避免此結果，中央銀行必須將利率維持在與美國接近的水準，即使國內經濟狀況可能支持更高利率。

如《經濟學人》所指出，金融自由化後，跨境資本流動已成為新台幣匯率的主要驅動因素，而非貿易表現本身。這代表：

• 匯率反映的是全球金融情緒，而非單純的出口基本面

• 維持匯率穩定必須透過干預或利率壓抑來實現

3.4 匯率干預與過剩流動性

為了管理匯率，中央銀行經常：

• 買入外幣

• 賣出新台幣

此舉可防止升值，但同時向國內金融體系注入新台幣流動性。

即使央行嘗試進行「沖銷操作」，其結果仍是：

• 長期低利率環境

• 資金流動性充裕

• 信貸條件寬鬆

隨時間推移，這樣的政策組合促成了：

• 資產價格上漲

• 房地產泡沫

• 金融槓桿上升

從 Mundell–Fleming 的角度來看，台灣的貨幣政策已明確服從於匯率目標，正如三難困境所預測。

3.5 與新加坡的對比

《經濟學人》將台灣的做法與新加坡作出對比。

新加坡：

• 以匯率作為主要的貨幣政策工具

• 採取透明的匯率區間制度

• 清楚傳達隨生產力提升而逐步升值的長期方向

  

《經濟學人》認為，台灣可仿效新加坡，為新台幣建立清楚的長期升值路徑，而非透過不透明的干預維持低估。

然而，台灣中央銀行歷來偏好：

• 政策裁量權而非制度透明

• 非正式干預而非明確匯率目標

近期跡象顯示立場略有鬆動：

• 2025 年 11 月，台灣與美國財政部發表聯合聲明，承諾避免不公平的匯率作為

• 該聲明被解讀為對漸進升值持更大容忍度，即使未宣布正式制度轉變

3.6 就業作為政策優先考量

台灣選擇此政策路徑的重要原因之一是就業穩定。

台灣仍有數百萬勞工受僱於高度暴露於貿易競爭的製造業，這些產業多半：

• 利潤率偏低

• 與南韓、日本與中國企業直接競爭

新台幣若快速升值，可能：

• 侵蝕獲利

• 導致工廠關閉

• 引發大規模失業

中央銀行曾公開提及競爭對手國家的匯率作為政策參考，顯示其管理新台幣的目標在於維持出口競爭力，而非讓順差自然透過升值調整。

這一策略協助台灣：

• 將失業率維持在 4% 以下

• 即使在成長放緩時期，也避免大規模裁員

在此意義下，台灣是以較高的購買力與消費成長，換取就業穩定與產業延續。

3.7 三難困境如何導向「台灣病」

綜合而言：

• 台灣優先追求穩定且具競爭力的匯率

• 資本自由流動迫使利率維持低檔

• 低利率與匯率干預創造過剩流動性

• 過剩流動性推升資產價格與金融風險

• 匯率升值受抑，消費成長因此受限

這一連串選擇說明，台灣並非「犯錯」，而是做出了理性的政策取捨，只是這些取捨的後果正逐漸變得難以忽視。

4. 生產力、物價與新台幣的巴拉薩–薩繆爾森效應

本節透過一個標準的經濟理論──巴拉薩–薩繆爾森效應，說明為何在生產力與所得水準大幅提高的情況下，台灣的新台幣仍顯得「過於疲弱」。此理論有助於理解為何《經濟學人》認為台灣的情況不尋常，也解釋了為何台灣政策制定者認為問題比表面更為複雜。

4.1 以白話說明巴拉薩–薩繆爾森效應

巴拉薩–薩繆爾森效應描述的是一個國家在變得更富裕、更具生產力時，通常會出現的經濟過程。其基本邏輯是，生產力最快提升的部門往往是可貿易部門，例如製造業與出口產業。這些部門能夠支付更高的薪資，而非可貿易部門，如服務業的勞工，也會因此期待薪資同步上升。薪資上升進一步推高服務價格，隨著國內物價水準提高，實質匯率便會升值。

在正常情況下，經濟發展的傳導順序通常是：國家變得更富裕，薪資上升，物價提高，實質匯率隨之轉強。這也是為何日本、南韓或美國等高所得國家，普遍同時具有較高收入水準與較昂貴的在地服務價格。

4.2 為何台灣「違反常規」

台灣看起來並未遵循上述典型模式。儘管台灣已是高所得經濟體，是全球半導體生產力的領導者，人均 GDP 與日本相當甚至更高，但其服務價格仍相對低廉，國內整體物價水準偏低，新台幣在過去二十年間的實質匯率幾乎沒有明顯升值。

其中一個特別醒目的例子是經 GDP 調整後的大麥克指數。該指數在 2025 年底估計，新台幣相對美元被低估約 55%。對於一個達到台灣這種所得水準的經濟體而言，這樣的低估幅度相當罕見。理論上，隨著生產力大幅提升，匯率與物價應同步上升，但實際結果並非如此。

4.3 物價維持偏低的結構性原因

台灣的政策制定者認為，這種表面上的「低估」在一定程度上具有誤導性。他們指出，台灣長期對電力、水、交通等公共事業提供補貼，並將多項基本服務價格維持在低於市場水準的區間，同時物業稅與消費稅水準相對偏低。這些政策壓低了整體經濟的投入成本，進而使食品與服務價格偏低，使台灣在價格層面看起來比其所得水準更為便宜，也放大了以價格為基礎的匯率低估指標。

從這個角度來看，一個價格便宜的大麥克並不必然代表匯率被扭曲，而可能反映的是政策刻意壓低物價的結果，而非單純的匯率問題。

4.4 被壓抑的調整機制

即使將補貼因素納入考量，仍有一個重要現象無法忽視。在一般情況下，當可貿易部門的生產力顯著上升時，該部門薪資會提高，勞動市場趨於緊縮，薪資壓力逐步擴散至整體經濟，服務價格上升，實質匯率最終出現升值。

然而在台灣，這條傳導鏈條明顯受阻。製造業，特別是電子與半導體產業的生產力與利潤大幅成長，全球科技與 AI 熱潮進一步放大了這一趨勢。但同時，科技業以外的薪資成長依然疲弱，服務業薪資幾乎停滯，國內物價維持低檔，新台幣則被政策性地阻止升值。

尤其在 2008 至 2018 年間，電子產業利潤率偏低，出口商對匯率變動高度敏感，企業界公開反對新台幣升值，政策制定者因此優先考量出口競爭力而非結構性調整。中央銀行也承認，在出口產業壓力下，曾刻意抑制升值，追求其所稱的「動態平衡」，即略為偏弱但穩定的匯率。

結果是，巴拉薩–薩繆爾森效應未能透過匯率升值或全面性的薪資上升充分展現。

4.5 生產力成果的去向

由於調整機制被阻斷，生產力提升的成果並未轉化為全體薪資上升、服務價格提高或家庭購買力擴大，而是表現在其他層面，包括企業利潤增加、龐大的對外順差、資本大量流向海外投資，以及國內資產價格的上漲。

這有助於解釋為何台灣的消費占 GDP 比重顯著下降，為何薪資在生產力成長下仍然停滯，以及為何房價大幅上漲而所得成長卻未能跟上。簡言之，台灣的生產力確實提升，但其成果未能平均地透過薪資與物價傳遞至整體社會。

4.6 不同的解讀立場

這種結果引發了兩種主要觀點的對立。《經濟學人》認為，富裕經濟體不應同時擁有如此低廉的物價與疲弱的匯率，新台幣在基本面上存在失衡，而抑制升值只會延後必要調整並加劇結構性問題。相對地，台灣的政策制定者則主張，物價偏低源於刻意的結構性政策，而非單純的匯率操縱；在未解決薪資、稅制與補貼問題前，強制升值可能傷害成長，卻無法實質改善生活水準，因此匯率升值本身並非萬靈丹。

雙方至少有一點共識，即台灣正在出現可貿易部門高度繁榮，而非可貿易部門停滯的分化現象。這種分化導致利益衝突，高科技企業較能承受較強的匯率與薪資上升，而傳統產業仍高度依賴成本競爭力才能生存。

4.7 對「台灣病」的意義

從巴拉薩–薩繆爾森效應的角度來看，「台灣病」並不只是匯率問題，而是一種經濟傳導受阻的結果。生產力成長未能轉化為薪資上升，薪資上升未能推升物價，物價上升也未能帶動匯率升值。最終，台灣形成了出口強勁、內需疲弱、資產價格膨脹以及持續擴大的對外順差，為後續關於外部失衡與經常帳問題的討論奠定了基礎。5. 外部失衡：經常帳順差與匯率低估

第 4 節說明了台灣的生產力成長並未轉化為薪資上升、物價提高或匯率轉強。第 5 節進一步說明這些成長成果最終流向何處。答案相當直接：流向海外。台灣被壓抑的調整機制，最明顯地體現在異常龐大的經常帳順差上。

未完待續，Part 2 將繼續探討。

In November 2025, The Economist introduced the term “Taiwanese disease,” also called “Formosan flu,” to describe a set of economic imbalances forming inside Taiwan’s otherwise very successful economy. The phrase was deliberately provocative. It echoes “Dutch disease,” a well-known economic problem where a booming export sector causes a country’s currency to rise too much, damaging other parts of the economy.

But Taiwan’s situation is different.

Instead of letting its currency rise naturally as exports boomed, Taiwan’s central bank deliberately held down the value of the New Taiwan dollar (NT$). The goal was straightforward:

• keep exports cheap

• protect manufacturing jobs

• maintain global competitiveness, especially in high-tech industries like semiconductors

Under normal economic logic, a country that becomes richer and more productive should see its currency strengthen. A stronger currency increases citizens’ purchasing power and raises domestic living standards. The Economist argues that Taiwan blocked this normal adjustment, creating a kind of self-inflicted condition.

This is the core idea behind the term “Taiwan disease”:

Taiwan avoided one problem (a strong currency hurting exports) but created a different set of problems by doing so.

According to The Economist, Taiwan’s policies led to several side effects:

• an undervalued currency that no longer reflects Taiwan’s wealth,

• reduced consumer purchasing power, since imports like food, fuel, and goods become more expensive,

• surging asset prices, especially housing,

• financial risks, particularly in the insurance sector,

• and extreme trade and current-account surpluses, meaning Taiwan produces far more than it consumes.

The term was introduced mainly through two Economist articles:

• “The hidden risks in Taiwan’s boom”

• “Taiwan’s amazing economic achievements are yielding alarming strains”

Both articles argue that Taiwan successfully avoided a textbook Dutch disease scenario, where a booming sector crowds out others through currency appreciation. However, they claim the cost of avoiding that adjustment has been quietly accumulating inside the economy.

2. Symptoms and Traits of the “Taiwan Disease”

This section lays out what The Economist and supporting analyses identify as the observable symptoms of the so-called “Taiwan disease.” These are not abstract theories. They show up in prices, wages, housing, savings, and financial risk that everyday people feel, even if they do not describe them in economic terms.

2.1 A Persistently Undervalued Currency

The most central symptom is that Taiwan’s currency is unusually weak relative to how rich and productive the country is.

By late 2025, the GDP-adjusted Big Mac Index ranked the New Taiwan dollar (NT$) as the most undervalued currency in the world, estimating it to be about 55% undervalued against the U.S. dollar. The Big Mac Index compares the price of the same product across countries, adjusting for income levels, to estimate purchasing power.

Taiwan’s central bank disputes this measure, arguing that:

• Taiwan heavily subsidizes utilities like electricity, water, and transportation

• These subsidies keep local prices artificially low

• As a result, food and services appear cheaper than they “should” be, making the currency look weaker than it really is

Even with those caveats, there is broad agreement on a simpler fact:
Taiwan’s currency has not strengthened in line with its economic success.

Over the past two decades, Taiwan has become:

• one of Asia’s wealthiest economies,

• a global leader in advanced manufacturing,

• a critical supplier in semiconductors and AI hardware.

Yet during that same period, Taiwan’s real effective exchange rate (REER), which adjusts for inflation and trade partners, has remained unusually flat. For a fast-growing, high-income economy, this is abnormal. It suggests that policy actions were repeatedly taken to prevent appreciation, rather than the currency being left to market forces.

2.2 Export Dependence and Extreme External Surpluses

A weak currency has predictable effects. It:

• makes exports cheaper for foreign buyers

• makes imports more expensive for domestic consumers

In Taiwan’s case, this has produced extraordinarily large trade and current-account surpluses.

Among major economies, Taiwan has recorded the largest current-account surplus as a percentage of GDP in the 21st century, excluding oil states or special re-export hubs. In recent years:

• the current-account surplus reached around 16% of GDP

• Taiwan’s goods trade surplus surged to roughly 31% of GDP (annualized) by late 2025

To put that in perspective:

• China’s surplus is around 3% of GDP

• Germany and Japan typically range between 3–8%

These numbers mean that Taiwan produces far more than it consumes domestically. The gap is not temporary. It has grown steadily as domestic consumption weakened.

One striking indicator is that private consumption’s share of GDP has fallen by about 20 percentage points since 1998. For a high-income democracy, this is an unusually large decline. It signals that growth is driven increasingly by exports and investment, not household spending.

Economically, an undervalued currency acts like:

• a subsidy to producers, who benefit from export competitiveness

• a tax on consumers, who face higher prices for imported goods like food, fuel, and electronics

This creates a self-reinforcing cycle:

• weak consumption → larger trade surpluses

• larger surpluses → excess savings

• excess savings → capital sent abroad instead of spent at home

2.3 Financial Vulnerabilities from Excess Savings

When an economy consistently saves more than it spends, the surplus money has to go somewhere. In Taiwan’s case, it has gone overseas, creating financial risks at home.

The most important example is Taiwan’s life insurance sector.

Taiwanese life insurers hold nearly US$1 trillion in foreign assets, mostly U.S. Treasury bonds. However:

• their liabilities, meaning insurance policies and payouts, are denominated in NT$.

This creates a currency mismatch. If the NT$ were to suddenly strengthen or if the U.S. dollar weakened sharply, the value of insurers’ foreign assets would fall in NT$ terms, potentially causing massive losses.

The Economist warned that a continued depreciation of the U.S. dollar could threaten the solvency of Taiwan’s insurers, which would then pose risks to the broader financial system.

This risk helps explain why Taiwan’s central bank has been so cautious about allowing currency appreciation.

At the same time:

• Taiwan’s foreign exchange reserves exceeded US$600 billion in 2025

• Profits from managing these reserves now account for about 6% of government fiscal revenue, compared with roughly 0.4% in typical developed economies

This creates institutional incentives to maintain the current system of intervention, even as risks accumulate.

2.4 Asset Price Inflation and the Housing Crisis

Another major symptom is rapid asset price inflation, especially in housing.

Years of:

• low interest rates

• abundant liquidity

• and limited housing supply

have fueled a long-running housing boom.

Since the late 1990s:

• Taiwan’s house prices have roughly quadrupled, far outpacing income growth

By 2025:

• the average home price in Taipei was about 15.8 times annual household income

• the national price-to-income ratio was around 10.2

• average mortgages consumed 45% of household income nationally, and nearly 70% in Taipei

For comparison:

• Seoul’s ratio is about 14

• Los Angeles, one of the least affordable U.S. cities, is 12.2

The link to currency policy matters here. When the central bank buys foreign currency to suppress the NT$, it injects NT$ into the financial system. Even when partially sterilized, this process:

• lowers interest rates

• increases liquidity

• encourages borrowing and asset speculation

The result has been a housing market increasingly out of reach for younger generations, worsening intergenerational inequality.

2.5 Wage Stagnation and Rising Inequality

Despite strong GDP growth, wages have barely kept pace.

Since 2000:

• GDP grew at about 3% per year

• median wages grew only 1–2% per year

Labor’s share of national income has fallen:

• from about 55% of GDP around 2000

• to below 48% by 2025

Capital’s share has risen correspondingly above 52%.

Today:

• about half of full-time workers earn less than NT$40,000 per month, which is modest given Taiwan’s living costs

• wages in the tech sector have surged

• while services and traditional manufacturing lag far behind

This uneven growth has widened income inequality and reinforced the housing divide, since rising asset prices benefit older property owners far more than younger workers.

2.6 Summary of the Symptom Pattern

Taken together, these traits form the diagnosis:

• a currency that does not reflect economic strength

• excessive reliance on exports

• weak domestic consumption

• financial exposure from recycled surpluses

• inflated asset prices

• stagnant wages and widening inequality

Taiwan’s economy remains globally successful, but these symptoms reveal internal strains beneath the surface, which The Economist described as “alarming strains” accompanying extraordinary achievements.

3. Exchange Rate Policy and the Impossible Trinity (A Mundell-Fleming Perspective)

To understand why the symptoms in Section 2 exist, we need to look at the policy trade-offs Taiwan has made. Economists usually explain this using a framework called the Impossible Trinity, also known as the Mundell-Fleming trilemma.

3.1 The Impossible Trinity Explained Simply

The Impossible Trinity says that a country cannot fully achieve all three of the following at the same time:

1. A stable or tightly managed exchange rate

2. Free movement of capital across borders (money can flow in and out easily)

3. Independent monetary policy (setting interest rates based on domestic needs)

A country can choose any two, but must give up the third.

Taiwan’s choices over the past few decades have been clear:

• Taiwan allows free capital flows

• Taiwan actively manages its exchange rate to keep the NT$ relatively stable and slightly weak

• As a result, Taiwan has given up a large degree of monetary independence.

This trade-off sits at the heart of the “Taiwan disease.”

3.2 Taiwan as a Small, Open Economy

Taiwan is a small open economy, meaning:

• it trades heavily with the rest of the world,

• foreign investors can move money in and out with few restrictions,

• its financial markets are highly exposed to global conditions.

Foreign investors hold large positions in Taiwanese stocks, especially in major tech firms like TSMC. When global investors feel optimistic about technology, capital flows into Taiwan. When geopolitical risk rises or global markets weaken, capital flows out.

Because capital moves freely:

• interest rate differences between Taiwan and the U.S. matter a lot,

• even small rate changes can trigger large capital flows.

3.3 Why Exchange Rate Stability Constrains Interest Rates

Taiwan’s central bank has long tried to prevent sharp appreciation of the NT$ to protect exporters and manufacturing employment.

Here is the key mechanism:

• If Taiwan raises interest rates significantly above U.S. rates, foreign investors would pour money into Taiwan to earn higher returns.

• Those inflows would push the NT$ up.

• A stronger NT$ would hurt exporters.

To avoid this, Taiwan’s central bank has had to keep interest rates low and closely aligned with U.S. interest rates, even when domestic conditions might justify higher rates.

As The Economist notes, since financial liberalization, cross-border capital flows have become the main driver of NT$ movements, not trade performance. This means:

• the exchange rate often reflects global financial sentiment rather than Taiwan’s export fundamentals,

• stabilizing the NT$ requires either intervention or interest-rate restraint.

3.4 Comparison with Singapore

The Economist contrasts Taiwan’s approach with Singapore, which manages the trilemma differently.

Singapore:

• uses the exchange rate itself as the main monetary policy tool

• operates a transparent band for its currency

• communicates a clear long-term appreciation path as productivity rises

  

The Economist argues that Taiwan should similarly establish a long-term path for the NT$, allowing gradual appreciation instead of opaque intervention.

Taiwan’s central bank, however, has historically preferred:

• discretion over transparency,

• informal intervention over explicit currency targets.

Recent developments suggest some softening:

• a November 2025 joint statement with the U.S. Treasury committed Taiwan to avoiding unfair exchange-rate practices

• this hinted at greater tolerance for gradual appreciation, even if no formal regime change was announced

3.6 Employment as a Policy Priority

One reason Taiwan has chosen this path is employment protection.

Taiwan still employs millions of workers in trade-exposed manufacturing sectors, many of which:

• operate on thin margins

• compete directly with firms in South Korea, Japan, and China

A sharp NT$ appreciation could:

• wipe out profitability

• trigger factory closures

• cause mass layoffs in traditional industries

The central bank has openly referenced competitor currencies when managing the NT$, aiming to preserve export competitiveness rather than letting surpluses correct through appreciation.

This strategy helped Taiwan:

• keep unemployment below 4%

• avoid large job losses even during periods of sluggish growth

In this sense, Taiwan traded:

higher purchasing power and consumption

for

employment stability and industrial continuity.

3.7 How the Trilemma Leads to the “Taiwan Disease”

Putting everything together:

• Taiwan prioritized a stable and competitive exchange rate.

• Free capital flows forced interest rates to remain low.

• Low rates and currency intervention created excess liquidity.

• Excess liquidity fueled asset inflation and financial risk.

• Suppressed currency appreciation weakened consumption growth.

This chain explains how Taiwan “caught” the Taiwan disease through policy trade-offs that made sense individually yet created long-term imbalances collectively.

The Impossible Trinity does not say Taiwan made a mistake. It says Taiwan made a choice, and that choice came with predictable consequences that are now becoming harder to manage.

4. Productivity, Prices, and the Balassa-Samuelson Effect on the NT Dollar

This section explains why Taiwan’s currency looks “too weak” given how productive and wealthy the economy is, using a standard economic idea called the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This theory helps clarify why The Economist sees Taiwan’s situation as abnormal, and why Taiwanese policymakers argue the story is more complicated.

4.1 The Balassa-Samuelson Effect, in Plain Language

The Balassa-Samuelson effect describes what usually happens when a country becomes more productive and richer.

The basic logic is:

• Productivity rises fastest in tradable sectors like manufacturing and exports

• Firms in these sectors can afford to pay higher wages

• Workers in non-tradable sectors like services expect higher wages too

• Higher wages raise the prices of services

• As domestic prices rise, the real exchange rate appreciates

  

So in a normal case:

richer country → higher wages → higher prices → stronger currency (in real terms)

That is why countries like Japan, South Korea, or the U.S. tend to have both higher incomes and more expensive local services.

4.2 Why Taiwan “Breaks the Rule”

Taiwan appears to defy this pattern.

Despite being:

• a high-income economy

• a global leader in semiconductor productivity

• comparable to or richer than Japan in per-capita GDP

Taiwan still has:

• relatively cheap services

• low domestic price levels

• and a currency that has barely appreciated in real terms over two decades

One striking illustration is the GDP-adjusted Big Mac Index, which estimated the NT$ to be about 55% undervalued against the U.S. dollar in late 2025. For an economy at Taiwan’s income level, this is unusually large.

In theory, Taiwan’s currency and prices should have risen as productivity surged. Instead, they did not.

4.3 Structural Reasons Prices Stay Low

Taiwanese officials argue that this apparent “undervaluation” is partly misleading.

They point out that Taiwan:

• subsidizes electricity, water, transportation, and other utilities

• keeps many essential services priced below market cost

• has relatively low property and consumption taxes

These policies suppress input costs across the economy, which:

• lowers food and service prices

• makes Taiwan appear cheaper than its income level would suggest

• exaggerates currency undervaluation in price-based measures

From this perspective, a cheap Big Mac does not automatically mean a mispriced currency. It may reflect policy-driven low prices, not exchange rate distortion alone.

4.4 The Suppressed Adjustment Mechanism

Even after accounting for subsidies, something important still stands out.

Normally, when productivity in tradable sectors rises sharply:

• wages in those sectors increase

• labor markets tighten

• wage pressure spreads across the economy

• service prices rise

• and the currency appreciates in real terms

In Taiwan, this transmission was muted.

Manufacturing productivity and profits surged, especially in electronics and semiconductors. The global tech and AI boom amplified this further. Yet:

• wage growth outside tech remained weak

• service-sector wages barely increased

• domestic prices stayed low

• and the NT$ was actively prevented from appreciating

During 2008–2018 in particular:

• profit margins in electronics were thin

• exporters were highly sensitive to exchange-rate changes

• business leaders openly lobbied against NT$ appreciation

• policymakers prioritized competitiveness over adjustment

The central bank acknowledged that it resisted appreciation under pressure from exporters, aiming for what it called a “dynamic balance”, meaning a slightly weak but stable currency.

As a result, the Balassa-Samuelson effect did not fully play out through currency appreciation or broad wage increases.

4.5 Where the Productivity Gains Went Instead

Because the adjustment was blocked, productivity gains flowed elsewhere.

Instead of raising:

• wages economy-wide

• service prices

• household purchasing power

they showed up as:

• corporate profits

• massive external surpluses

• capital invested abroad

• and asset price inflation at home

This helps explain why:

• Taiwan’s consumption share of GDP fell sharply

• wages stagnated despite productivity gains

• housing prices surged while incomes lagged

In short, Taiwan became much more productive, but the benefits were not evenly transmitted through wages and prices.

4.6 Competing Interpretations

This leads to two competing views.

The Economist’s view:

• A rich economy should not have such cheap prices and a weak currency.

• Taiwan’s NT$ is fundamentally misaligned.

• Suppressing appreciation delays necessary adjustment and worsens imbalances.

Taiwan’s policymakers’ view:

• Prices are low because of deliberate structural policies, not just currency manipulation.

• Forcing appreciation without fixing wages, taxes, or subsidies could hurt growth without meaningfully improving living standards.

• Currency appreciation alone is not a cure.

Both sides agree on one thing:

• Taiwan has a growing divide between booming tradable sectors (tech) and stagnant non-tradable sectors (services, traditional manufacturing).

This divergence creates conflicting interests:

• high-tech firms could tolerate higher wages and a stronger currency,

• weaker sectors depend on cost competitiveness to survive.

4.7 Why This Matters for the “Taiwan Disease”

The Balassa-Samuelson lens shows that the “Taiwan disease” is not simply about exchange rates.

It is about blocked transmission:

• productivity gains did not translate into higher wages

• higher wages did not translate into higher prices

• higher prices did not translate into currency appreciation

Instead, Taiwan ended up with:

• strong exports

• weak consumption

• asset inflation

• and external surpluses

To be continued in part 2

By: Nathan S.

1963 年出生於歷史悠久的台南市，黃仁勳（Jensen Huang）一直與自己的出生地保持深厚的文化連結。1970 年代初，他的父母為了讓孩子能接受更好的教育，將九歲的黃仁勳和哥哥送往海外。這項決定其實也是當時更廣泛的社會趨勢之一：在 20 世紀後半葉，許多台灣家庭投入大量資源，將孩子送往美國等地就學。

儘管在美國求學成長，他的台灣背景依然是其身份的重要核心。黃仁勳能說流利的中文與台灣話。他常常歸功於成長過程中特別是母親對學習的高度重視，認為這深刻影響了他的領導風格。他曾分享一個故事：母親雖然自己不會說英文，卻拿著字典一字一句教他英文，讓他從小就培養出「直接面對困難」的心態。

這種不斷好奇、相信「沒有不可能」的精神，源自他在台南的童年，也成為 1993 年創立 NVIDIA 的底層動力。NVIDIA 的圖形處理器（GPU）最初是用在電玩上，如今則成為生成式 AI 浪潮背後深度學習運算的核心動力。到了 2025 年，公司的驚人成長已經讓 NVIDIA 成為全球經濟下一波科技革命的中心。

「家鄉英雄」與「Jensanity」的力量

儘管在美國生活數十年，黃仁勳在台灣的連結與知名度卻越來越高。他被親切地稱為台灣科技界的「家鄉英雄」，是代表性人物之一。他經常回到台灣分享經驗，而他的出現往往與重要活動同步，例如台北國際電腦展 Computex，他常擔任焦點講者。他在 2025 年 Computex 期間被大批粉絲包圍、索取簽名與自拍的盛況，被媒體稱為「Jensanity（仁勳狂熱）」。

然而這些返台行程不僅是人氣的展現，更具有國家層級的象徵意義。他近年來多次與台灣最高層的政治與科技領袖會面，討論台灣在關鍵科技中的角色。他穿著招牌的黑皮衣，與台灣總統會面或走訪晶圓廠的畫面，象徵故事走到「全程回歸」的一刻：這位出生於台灣的全球科技巨人如今與當地產業並肩合作，猶如海外遊子帶著知識與機遇歸來。他的受歡迎程度象徵著台灣在全球舞台的積極參與，也再次強化了台灣作為高科技強國的形象。

矽的共生：NVIDIA 與台灣的相互依存

在這一切個人故事背後，其實是非常現實的商業依存關係：NVIDIA 的巨大成功與台灣的半導體實力密不可分。

這段關係建立於台灣科技產業的根基上。1980 年，台灣政府成立竹科；1987 年，又支持創立台灣積體電路製造公司（TSMC）。在張忠謀博士領導下，TSMC 開創了「純代工」模式，專注於為客戶製造晶片，使得像 NVIDIA 這樣的「無廠半導體公司」（fabless）得以蓬勃發展。黃仁勳的年輕公司因此能與 TSMC 合作製造尖端晶片，而無需自建極其昂貴的工廠。

這樣的雙贏模式，使得 NVIDIA 能專注於創新設計，而 TSMC 則持續提升製程技術，共同推動彼此成為全球科技巨頭。

如今，TSMC 仍是 NVIDIA 最先進晶片（如 A100、H100 等 AI 處理器）的主要製造基地。這些晶片是 AI 超級電腦與雲端資料中心的核心引擎，而台灣在其中扮演的角色極為重要：

• 2023 年，TSMC 一家公司就佔台灣 GDP 的約 8%、出口的約 12%。

• 台積電生產全球超過 90% 的先進製程晶片（7 奈米以下）。

這些數據讓台灣被稱為「矽島」，而竹科則成為全球科技供應鏈的樞紐。

NVIDIA 帶來設計與市場需求，而台灣提供無可比擬的製造能力，形成高度共生關係。然而，這也意味著 NVIDIA 的命運與台灣的穩定度緊密綁在一起。分析師常警告，若台灣因天災或地緣衝突受擾，NVIDIA 的全球供應鏈將立即陷入混亂。

因此形成了「矽盾」概念：因為全球包括 NVIDIA、Apple、Qualcomm 在內的企業都高度依賴台灣晶片，各國對維持台灣安全有著強烈的共同利益。

黃仁勳也多次公開強調：沒有台灣的先進製造能力，全球的 AI 革命將瞬間停擺。

在地投資與「AI 島」的加速

NVIDIA 透過在地投資、研究合作與人才培育，積極支持台灣「AI 島」願景。公司在台灣的佈局已超越代工合作，延伸至大型 AI 設施、R&D 中心與產業升級。

R&D 與台北一號（Taipei-1）超級電腦

2022 年，NVIDIA 在台北成立亞太區重要的研發中心，由政府支持。其工程師在此參與 GPU 架構、AI 雲軟體等核心專案。

此投資的成果之一就是 台灣最強 AI 超級電腦「Taipei-1」，由 64 台 NVIDIA DGX 系統組成，用於支持台灣企業、學研單位進行高強度 AI 訓練。

高雄 AI 工廠與 Blackwell 晶片部署

NVIDIA 與鴻海合作，在高雄打造台灣規模最大的 AI 工廠，投資額達 14 億美元，預計 2026 年上半年完工。

它將成為亞洲第一座 GB300 等級 AI 資料中心，代表部署最新的 NVIDIA Blackwell 系列晶片，用於最大、最複雜的基礎模型運算。

該中心也使用 NVIDIA 的 800V 直流電架構，專為高密度 AI 計算設計，大幅提升能源效率。

此外，新成立的 Visionbay.ai 將負責營運，推動台灣「主權 AI」能力。

在台設立子公司與總部

2025 年 11 月，台灣經濟部批准 NVIDIA 成立新子公司，投資超過 10 億台幣，並市場定位為獨立法人。比起過去的三個分公司，新子公司可自行持有資產、簽署大型合約、進行 R&D 資金運作，顯示 NVIDIA 的長期承諾。

同時，NVIDIA 計畫在台北北投士林科技園區建立新的台灣總部，市府預計在 2026 年農曆新年前完成協議。

「AI 島」願景：向價值鏈上游移動

對台灣而言，與 NVIDIA 這樣的企業深化合作，是其升級策略的核心。台灣希望在 AI 時代不再只是製造晶片，而是參與 AI 系統、演算法、應用創新的創造者。

這包括：

• 吸引 NVIDIA 在台進行最前沿 R&D

• 建設大型 AI 資料中心，提供世界級算力

• 培育本地 AI 新創生態

• 讓台灣工程師參與全球最前沿的 AI 軟硬體開發

這意味著台灣正逐漸從「製造基地」轉變為「創新輸出國」。

挑戰與應對

然而，要成為 AI 強國也面臨挑戰，例如：

• AI 資料中心耗電量巨大，需要強化能源基礎建設

• 台灣需更多綠能與穩定電網

• 需要更高的冷卻效率與電力設計

政府已投入超過 1000 億台幣支援 AI 發展，包括電網升級與能源政策改革。

地緣政治中的互相依賴

黃仁勳與台灣的故事顯示一個重要現象：科技時代最關鍵的不是單一公司，而是互相依賴的生態系統。

• 台灣的晶片支撐整個世界的數位經濟

• 全球企業（如 NVIDIA）透過在台投資強化台灣的安全與國際地位

這構成了再強化一次的「矽盾」：全球若想維持科技進步，就必須維護台灣的穩定。

結語

黃仁勳的故事，不僅是個人的成功傳奇，更是台灣的故事。

這是一個：

• 培育人才

• 擁抱全球化

• 成為數位時代關鍵力量

的島嶼的故事。

隨著 AI 對世界影響日增，NVIDIA 與台灣的合作將更加緊密。他從台南走向世界，再回到台灣投入產業發展，象徵了全球華人科技人才的正向循環，也象徵了台灣在全球科技版圖的中心位置。

台灣與 NVIDIA 的未來正緊密相連，並將一起邁向科技的新前沿。

Born Huang Renxun in 1963 in the historic city of Tainan, Jensen Huang maintains strong cultural ties to his birthplace. In the early 1970s, his parents sent the nine-year-old Jensen and his older brother overseas, seeking better educational opportunities. This move was part of a broader wave where Taiwanese families invested heavily in sending their children abroad, primarily to the United States, in the latter half of the 20th century.

Though educated in America, his Taiwanese upbringing remains a core part of his identity. Huang is fluent in both Mandarin and the Taiwanese Hokkien dialect. He often credits his early home life, particularly his mother’s intense emphasis on learning, with shaping his leadership style. He once shared an anecdote that his mother, despite not speaking English herself, taught him the language using only a dictionary, instilling a mindset of tackling challenges directly.

This relentless curiosity and “nothing is impossible” outlook, rooted in his Tainan childhood, became the driving force behind the establishment of NVIDIA in 1993. NVIDIA’s Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), initially vital for video games, now power the deep-learning algorithms behind the generative AI boom. By 2025, the company’s growth had positioned it at the center of the global economy’s next technological wave.

The “Hometown Hero” and the Power of “Jensanity”

Despite decades in the U.S., Jensen Huang’s ties and celebrity status in Taiwan have only grown stronger. Affectionately dubbed a “hometown hero” of Taiwan’s tech community, he is seen as a successful son of the island who returns frequently to share his wisdom. Huang’s regular visits often coincide with major events like Computex Taipei, where he delivers headline keynotes. The “Jensanity” surrounding his 2025 Computex appearance, where he was trailed by crowds clamoring for autographs and selfies, captured his rock-star allure.

Huang’s trips are more than just fanfare; they carry national significance. In recent years, he has met with Taiwan’s top leaders and tech executives to discuss the island’s role in critical technologies. The image of Huang, in his trademark black leather jacket, collaborating with Taiwan’s President or touring a chip factory, exemplifies a full-circle narrative. This Taiwanese-born global tech titan now collaborates with the local industry that initially set him on his path, symbolizing the diaspora returning with knowledge and opportunity. His popularity is symbolic of Taiwan’s global engagement and reinforces the island’s identity as a high-tech powerhouse.

Silicon Symbiosis: NVIDIA’s Interdependence with Taiwan

Beneath the personal connections is a fundamental business reality: NVIDIA’s massive success is inextricably linked to Taiwan’s semiconductor might. This relationship is rooted in the very foundation of Taiwan’s tech industry. In 1980, the government established the Hsinchu Science Park, and in 1987, it backed the launch of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC).

Led by Dr. Morris Chang, TSMC pioneered the “pure-play” foundry model, focusing exclusively on fabricating chips for clients. This innovation enabled “fabless” chip designers like NVIDIA to flourish, allowing Huang’s young company to partner with TSMC to manufacture its cutting-edge graphics chips without needing to build its own expensive factories. This win-win relationship, leveraging TSMC’s ever-improving processes, helped NVIDIA become an industry powerhouse.

Today, TSMC in Hsinchu remains the primary manufacturer of NVIDIA’s most advanced chips, including flagship AI processors (like the A100 and H100 series) that are at the heart of AI supercomputers and cloud data centers. The scale of Taiwan’s contribution is difficult to overstate:

• As of 2023, TSMC alone accounted for roughly 8% of Taiwan’s entire GDP and about 12% of its total exports.

• Most astonishingly, TSMC produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced semiconductors (chips with features under 7 nanometers).

This reality has earned Taiwan the nickname “Silicon Island,” with Hsinchu Science Park becoming a premier node of the global tech supply chain.

The symbiosis is clear: NVIDIA provides the innovative designs and voracious market demand, while Taiwanese firms like TSMC provide the unparalleled manufacturing prowess. This partnership has allowed NVIDIA to push out new generations of chips at a breakneck pace. However, it also means NVIDIA’s fortunes are tightly tied to Taiwan’s stability and technological capacity. Analysts frequently warn that any serious disruption in Taiwan, due to natural disaster or geopolitical conflict, would immediately snarl NVIDIA’s supply chain and jeopardize its ability to deliver products globally.

This mutual dependence has led to the concept of the “silicon shield” protecting Taiwan. Because so many global giants (including NVIDIA, Apple, and Qualcomm) rely on chips made in Taiwan, the international community has a profound vested interest in preventing conflict and maintaining Taiwan’s security. Taiwan’s semiconductor fabs are not just economic assets but geopolitical leverage, intertwining the fate of a company like NVIDIA with the fate of Taiwan itself.

Jensen Huang has openly advocated for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, often reminding people that without Taiwan’s ability to produce advanced chips at massive scale, the AI revolution would stall worldwide. This fact is understood by policymakers around the globe: clamping down on Taiwan’s chip exports would damage Western tech leaders like NVIDIA. The silicon symbiosis forged by Huang’s company and Taiwan’s chipmakers illustrates a broader truth: no island, and no company, is an island unto itself in the modern tech economy.

Local Investment and the Acceleration of the AI Island

NVIDIA has actively backed Taiwan’s “AI Island” ambition through substantial investments in local infrastructure, research, and talent development. The company’s presence extends beyond manufacturing contracts to encompass sophisticated R&D and major AI computing facilities.

1. R&D and the Taipei-1 Supercomputer

In 2022, NVIDIA opened a significant Asia-Pacific research and development center in Taipei, a project that received support from the Taiwanese government. This center leverages Taiwan’s rich pool of engineering talent and proximity to manufacturing partners, with engineers working on projects from next-generation GPU architecture to AI cloud software.

A tangible outcome of this investment is the creation of “Taipei-1,” Taiwan’s most powerful AI supercomputer. This cluster utilizes 64 of NVIDIA’s advanced DGX systems, which are purpose-built, integrated AI supercomputing nodes. The DGX nodes employ high-speed NVLink or NVSwitch fabric to connect multiple GPUs (like the H100) into a single, massive accelerator, and are loaded with the NVIDIA AI software stack for maximum performance efficiency in deep learning. The computing power of Taipei-1 is provided to Taiwanese researchers, startups, and universities to foster a critical head start in domestic AI model development.

2. The Kaohsiung AI Factory and the Blackwell Chip Deployment

The most recent and significant collaboration involves Foxconn (Hon Hai Precision Industry) and the development of the “AI Factory” supercomputer facility in Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan. Recent announcements have solidified the scope and timeline of this massive venture, with the $1.4 billion facility now scheduled for completion by the first half of 2026.

This facility is slated to be Taiwan’s largest advanced GPU cluster. Key technical details confirm its role as a state-of-the-art AI infrastructure hub:

• Next-Generation Technology: The facility will be a 27-megawatt data center and is specifically set to be Asia’s first GB300 AI data center. This indicates deployment of NVIDIA’s next-generation Blackwell GB300 chips, which are crucial for running the largest and most complex foundation models.

• Infrastructure Optimization: Foxconn is adopting NVIDIA’s 800 VDC data center power architecture for the Kaohsiung center. This architecture is designed for high-density AI workloads and is engineered to reduce resistive losses, simplify power distribution, and improve energy conversion efficiency, directly addressing the massive power and cooling demands of next-generation GPU clusters.

• Sovereign AI Focus: The center will be operated by Foxconn’s new AI and cloud unit, Visionbay.ai, a trusted NVIDIA Cloud Partner. The project is central to Taiwan’s pursuit of “sovereign AI”—the ability to develop and govern AI systems using domestic data, infrastructure, and talent, thereby enhancing data security and technological autonomy.

• Factory Floor Integration: The partnership is also extending beyond the data center, with NVIDIA working with Foxconn to deploy AI directly across the latter’s factories and manufacturing lines. This reflects NVIDIA’s broader strategy to integrate its technology into industrial automation and aligns with Foxconn’s efforts to modernize its production systems.

3. Establishing a Corporate Anchor: The Taiwan Subsidiary and Headquarters

In a recent, highly symbolic move, NVIDIA formalized its commitment to the island’s long-term business and research environment through a critical structural change.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) approved NVIDIA’s application to set up a new subsidiary in Taiwan in November 2025. This is a key step, as NVIDIA previously operated through three Taiwan branches. The new subsidiary, backed by an investment exceeding NT$1 billion (approximately US$32.1 million), is an independent legal entity from its parent company.

This independent status allows the entity to independently hold assets, make large-scale purchases, sign more complex contracts, and offers greater flexibility in handling local tax and R&D funding issues. For a company planning multi-billion-dollar investments and complex infrastructure projects like the Kaohsiung AI Factory, establishing a fully functional local subsidiary is a necessary precondition for long-term operational and financial flexibility.

The New Taipei Headquarters

The establishment of the subsidiary is intrinsically linked to NVIDIA’s plan to build its new Taiwan headquarters. NVIDIA has provided a letter of intent to develop the new headquarters at the Beitou-Shilin Technology Park in Taipei.

The Taipei city government has actively worked to clear the way for this project by resolving land-use rights issues with a third-party insurer, proposing a large payment to relinquish those rights. Taipei’s Mayor has publicly expressed the intent to sign a final agreement with NVIDIA as early as the Lunar New Year holiday in February 2026, marking a critical step toward cementing NVIDIA’s physical presence and its role as an anchor for technology and talent in the capital city. This move is expected to attract digital nomads and reinforce Taiwan’s talent policy, which aims to make the island a global hub for high-skilled professionals.

The “AI Island” Vision: Moving Up the Value Chain

From Taiwan’s perspective, this deep engagement with Jensen Huang and NVIDIA is a timely, strategic boon. The government’s vision to transform the island into a global hub for AI, the “AI Island” ambition, is all about moving up the value chain. After decades of success in manufacturing semiconductors, Taiwan is eager to capture more of the value in the AI era, rather than simply fabricating chips for others.

Partnerships with firms like NVIDIA are central to this strategy. By hosting NVIDIA’s R&D centers, supporting mega-projects like the Kaohsiung AI Factory, and encouraging local AI startups, Taiwan aims to become a place where advanced AI solutions are created and deployed, not just where the chips are made. Government officials explicitly highlight collaborations with NVIDIA as proof that Taiwan can be a global center of AI development and high-performance computing.

The tangible signs of this evolution are the large AI data centers being built on Taiwanese soil. Packed with NVIDIA hardware, they will provide domestic companies and researchers with world-class computing power that was previously out of reach, spurring a new wave of homegrown innovations in areas from AI software to smart manufacturing. Moreover, NVIDIA’s decision to conduct cutting-edge design and software work in Taiwan means Taiwanese engineers are gaining know-how at the forefront of AI algorithms and systems. This is an important shift: Taiwan is increasingly exporting innovation and IP, with its workforce contributing to global R&D projects.

Navigating Challenges

Ambitions to become an AI leader are not without challenges, however. Massive AI supercomputing centers demand equally massive power and cooling, necessitating upgrades to Taiwan’s infrastructure. Rolling out 100 MW of data center capacity in Kaohsiung, for example, raises serious questions about stable power supply and sustainable energy sourcing. Taiwan’s government is tackling this head-on, with efforts to reinforce the electrical grid, invest in renewable energy, and promote energy-efficient designs, like NVIDIA’s high-efficiency 800-volt DC power systems. In 2023, Taiwan’s cabinet approved over NT$100 billion (~US$3.2 billion) in funding to support AI development, signaling a strong commitment to building the necessary infrastructure and talent base for the AI Island vision.

The Geopolitical Significance of Interdependence

Zooming out, the intertwined story of Jensen Huang and Taiwan carries profound economic and geopolitical implications. It underscores a growing, essential two-way interdependence. On one hand, Taiwan’s semiconductor infrastructure underpins the entire modern digital economy, making our AI gadgets and cloud services possible. On the other hand, global companies like NVIDIA contribute significantly to Taiwan’s growth and security by investing capital, creating high-skilled jobs, and actively championing Taiwan’s importance on the world stage.

This reciprocal relationship reinforces the aforementioned silicon shield. The world’s reliance on Taiwan’s chips gives major economies a strong incentive to support Taiwan’s stability. If Taiwan remains secure and thriving, companies like NVIDIA, Apple, and AMD can continue to drive global innovation and prosperity. Conversely, any turmoil in Taiwan would send massive shockwaves through global supply chains, markets, and research labs, a scenario governments are keenly motivated to avoid.

Ultimately, the human element ties it all together. Jensen Huang’s personal journey and NVIDIA’s engagement in Taiwan exemplify the positive feedback loop of diaspora and development. Huang stands as living proof that a young boy from Tainan can grow up to change the world and then help his homeland in return, serving as a source of knowledge exchange and pride. Likewise, NVIDIA’s presence shows how Taiwan’s ecosystem underpins and enriches the modern tech economy. This mutually beneficial relationship is expected to grow even stronger as the demand for AI accelerates.

In sum, the story of Jensen Huang is more than one man’s success. It is Taiwan’s story. It is the story of a dynamic, resilient island that nurtured talent, embraced globalization, and emerged as a linchpin of the digital age. The quest to build a brighter future in AI is bringing the entire “AI Island” along for the ride. Taiwan and NVIDIA’s futures are tightly bound, charting a path into the new frontier of technology built on trust, innovation, and shared aspiration.

By: Nathan S.

For international readers seeking to understand Taiwan’s investment landscape, it is essential to grasp not only the industries driving Taiwan’s economic rise, but also the people themselves. These include iconic retail investors and the executives steering the island’s largest financial conglomerates. Together, they form a unique investment culture that blends prudence, patience, risk awareness, and strategic global positioning.

This article introduces that landscape, and then breaks Taiwanese investors into two broad categories:

1. Legendary individual investors whose discipline and insight earned them market prominence

2. Financial sector leaders who manage some of the largest asset pools in Asia

A. Taiwan’s Investment Culture: Discipline, Prudence, and an Eye for Fundamentals

To understand Taiwanese investors, both individuals and institutions, you must first understand Taiwan’s financial DNA.

1. A conservative but sophisticated investor base

Taiwan has one of the highest retail-trading participation rates in Asia, with more than 13 million active trading accounts. This is remarkable given its population of just 23 million. Retail investors in Taiwan have historically been highly engaged, yet cautious. The culture emphasizes:

• Fundamental analysis

• Long-term holding

• Risk management over speculation

• Strong trust in large-cap companies, especially in technology

2. The central role of technology, especially semiconductors

Taiwan’s stock market performance is tied closely to the semiconductor cycle. Companies such as:

• TSMC (台積電)

• MediaTek (聯發科)

• ASE Technology (日月光)

command strong attention from domestic investors because they represent Taiwan’s global competitive advantage.

3. A deep and mature financial system

Taiwan is home to several of Asia’s largest financial-holding companies, with assets exceeding the GDP of many small countries. These institutions:

• Provide liquidity across capital markets

• Allocate trillions in assets

• Act as long-term stabilizers in the economy

Their leadership, although less known internationally, plays a massive role in shaping Taiwan’s financial direction.

B. Legendary Individual Investors: The Faces Behind Taiwan’s Stock-Market Folklore

Taiwan’s market history includes several iconic figures. These are women and men who built fortunes through discipline, deep analysis, and a patient understanding of business fundamentals.

Below are two of the most influential personalities.

1. The “Taiwan Buffett”: Hsu Ching-Hsiang (許慶祥)

One of Taiwan’s most respected value investors, Hsu Ching-Hsiang (許慶祥), is often referred to as the “Taiwan Buffett” for his commitment to long-term, fundamentals-based investing.

His journey is a modern Taiwanese classic:

• Originally a small-town medical doctor in Taitung

• Once struggled to afford an NT$8,000 rent

• Spent more than 20 years reading six to eight hours of financial and industry reports daily

• Grew his investment value more than one hundredfold in roughly two decades

• Accumulated a fortune worth several billions of New Taiwan dollars

Signature Investment: Hon Hai or Foxconn (鴻海)

Hsu famously held shares of Foxconn for more than 15 years, refusing to sell during downturns. His philosophy mirrors that of Warren Buffett and emphasizes buying wonderful companies at reasonable prices, ignoring short-term market noise, and treating stocks as ownership in real businesses.

Hsu represents the ideal Taiwanese retail investor: patient, research driven, and deeply committed to understanding a company’s intrinsic value.

2. The Strategist Who “Escaped the Bubble”: Jung-An Chiu (榮安邱 / 邱明宏)

Another iconic figure is Jung-An Chiu (榮安邱 / 邱明宏), one of the legendary “Four Kings of the Taiwanese Stock Market” during the boom of the 1980s and 1990s.

Chiu stands out for a rare achievement. He exited the local market before the crash and successfully reinvested abroad.

His strategic moves include:

• Selling major positions in Taiwanese financial stocks around 1990, near the peak

• Redirecting capital to Hong Kong

• Becoming a large shareholder of HSBC (滙豐銀行)

• Riding the Hang Seng Index’s rise from roughly 2,900 points in 1990 to over 33,000 points in 2017

Chiu represents the opposite of Hsu. Rather than a hold-forever purist, he is a macro strategist who reads geopolitical and economic shifts with precision.

Both investors illustrate the diversity of perspectives that have shaped Taiwan’s market for decades.

C. The Institutional Titans: Financial-Holding Leaders Who Quietly Move Trillions

While individual investors inspire fascination, the true capital power in Taiwan lies in its giant financial-holding companies. These institutions manage trillions of New Taiwan dollars and influence capital flows across Asia.

Their leaders rarely appear on international front pages, yet they oversee asset pools comparable to those of large sovereign wealth funds.

1. Fubon Group (富邦集團): Taiwan’s Largest Business Group

Assets: Over NT$14.25 trillion
Key leaders:

• Richard Tsai (蔡明興), Chairman of Fubon Financial

• Daniel Tsai (蔡明忠), Chairman of Fubon Group

Fubon has topped Taiwan’s asset rankings for five consecutive years. The group operates across:

• Banking

• Insurance

• Securities

• Telecom (Taiwan Mobile)

• E-commerce (momo購物網)

Fubon Financial alone holds more than 12 trillion New Taiwan dollars in assets and is one of the largest financial institutions in Asia.

2. Cathay or Lin-Yuan Group (國泰 / 霖園集團)

Assets: Approximately NT$13.9 trillion
Key leaders:

• T.Y. Tsai (蔡鎮宇), Chair of Cathay Financial

• Hong Tu Tsai (蔡宏圖), Honorary Chair

• The second-generation Tsai family members who manage the broader Lin-Yuan business empire

Cathay is a stabilizing force in Taiwan’s economy, with leading positions in banking, life insurance, real estate, and regional expansion.

3. CTBC Group (中信金控 / 中信集團)

Assets: Approximately NT$8.8 trillion
Key leaders:

• Morris Li (利明献), Chairman of CTBC Financial

• Jeffrey Koo Jr. (辜仲諒), Chairman of CTBC Bank and former group leader

CTBC is recognized internationally for its cross-border banking reach, corporate lending strength, and leadership in overseas insurance and investment services.

Why These Groups Matter Globally

Together, these institutions manage assets far exceeding Taiwan’s annual GDP of roughly NT$7 trillion. Their decisions directly influence:

• Asian bond markets

• Cross-border capital flows

• Buy-side and sell-side activity

• Global insurance capital

• Regional economic stability

For global investors, understanding Taiwan requires understanding these institutional giants.

Conclusion: Taiwan’s Investors Form a Dual Engine Driving Its Global Influence

Taiwan’s investment landscape is shaped at two levels.

1. The individual legends

These include figures such as Hsu Ching-Hsiang (許慶祥) and Jung-An Chiu (榮安邱), whose discipline, foresight, and courage built fortunes and inspired generations of retail investors.

2. The institutional titans

These include the leaders of Fubon, Cathay, and CTBC, whose trillion-dollar balance sheets influence regional capital allocation and Taiwan’s long-term financial resilience.

Together, they form a system where:

• Long-term thinking is rewarded

• Retail participation is unusually high

• Technology shapes market concentration

• Financial institutions provide systemic stability

• Global macro trends guide capital allocation

For global readers, Taiwan’s market reveals an ecosystem in which individual insight and institutional power work side by side, shaping one of the most dynamic and resilient investment environments in Asia.

By: Nathan S.

So, what happened?

Well, trading activity spiked significantly in 2021 and didn’t fizzle away. Taiwan’s trading volume and values spiked throughout the pandemic years, peaking in 2021.1 The Taiwan Stock Exchange Fact Book notes that the total trading volume was around 1.497 trillion shares, and that the daily average trading value specifically boomed in 2021. Of course, trading volume and values did eventually fizzle down, but they didn’t fizzle away—they remained notably above pre-pandemic levels.

Furthermore, not only did activity spike, but so did the opening of new accounts and active participation among previously inactive users. Statistics tracking “effective trading accumulated account holders,” which can be seen as representative of new trading accounts opened in Taiwan, extended to over 13 million—an enormous number, especially given Taiwan’s small population.

To get into the specifics of shares and trading, margin trading expanded, and the retail leverage increased. In 2021, TWSE’s numbers reveal that margin purchases and securities-margin trading share began to increase. This implies that not only were more individuals trading, but they were also using borrowed funds to do so. Again, the margin activity did die down in later years, but this spike left a lasting impact on the liquidity and tail risk of the market.2

Additionally, the market began to cluster around the tech industry, especially Taiwan’s renowned TSMC. This allowed for benchmark indices to be notched a few pegs. This clustering was fueled by the rapidly increasing demand for AI chips, which caused TSMC’s market value to soar, an increase in overall index gains, and gave it a place among the world’s largest firms.3

So as a result of all this, Taiwan’s trading efficiency improved, lifting the Taiwanese market higher among global rankings. Specific improvements noted by the TWSE include a larger market size (as earlier mentioned), higher average monthly transaction value, and again, an elevated interactional ranking that reflects structural improvements in trading, along with activity increases.4

Why did this happen?

Other than the obvious factors of a low-rate environment and abundant liquidity, which urged investors to contribute to riskier assets, there were many factors that drove individuals to invest more.5

First of all, a possible driver is social media. Influencers were successful at their purpose of influencing people, creating a tide that became bigger and more influential with every collected wave of people willing to try out or become more active in investing.6 Secondly, lockdowns meant fewer opportunities to spend money. These accumulated savings served as newly available investable cash for individuals. Also, global policy rates were low throughout the pandemic, making equities attractive for retail savers who wanted returns more substantial than what bank interest could offer them.

And, last but not least, TSMC. The huge demand for chips caused by AI resulted in high expectations for semiconductor profits. This disproportionally benefited the Taiwanese market since Taiwan is the largest producer of semiconductors globally, and served as another set of hands pushing individuals to invest more.7

What were the implications of this? Were they mostly positive or negative? Pinpointing all of the implications and labelling them as positive or negative is complicated, but here is a short, oversimplified list:

Positive effects

• An increase in household participation in capital markets

• An increase in capital available for more innovative firms

• Improved liquidity (and price discovery)

Negative effects

• The risk of overconcentration and the fragility of valuation

• Leverage and margin risks, amplifying forced liquidations

• Increased volatility, mispricing

• Risks for inexperienced investors

Ultimately, this boom in retail investing is still relevant because the effects caused by the surge didn’t end along with the pandemic. Trading behavior today is still influenced by what investors learned back then. Additionally, understanding the “how” and “why” of the increase is significant. AI demand continues to rise, and Taiwan’s technology sector is becoming more and more vital to the global market. So, margin exposure and tech-sector concentration could easily resurface as major issues in the future.

By: Sihyun P.

(https://substack.com/@hyunnpark)

2023年初：嚴重短缺與價格飆升

2023年初，台灣面臨嚴重的蛋荒，批發蛋價飆升到創紀錄的每台斤（600克）55台幣。每日蛋缺口最高達到50萬到80萬顆。此短缺由多個因素合併造成：

• 禽流感爆發嚴重，迫使全國大規模撲殺產蛋雞。

• 冬季寒冷造成雞隻產蛋率降低。

• 農曆新年後淘汰老年的母雞，暫時削減產能。

• 飼料成本上升，主要因全球玉米和大豆價格攀升，抑制了農戶擴產意願，擠壓利潤。

政府透過緊急措施因應，包括調高官方蛋價（由52元調升至55元）以激勵供應，並自多個國家大規模進口雞蛋及活母雞。3月到7月間，約有1.45億顆蛋進口，成功穩定供應及價格，至2023年中下旬形勢改善。

轉為過剩：2024年價格崩跌

至2023年底，台灣蛋市出現回轉——進口蛋與新成熟的母雞，加上氣候趨暖，推動供給超過需求。2024年中，每日生產超出需求超過百萬顆蛋，引發供過於求現象。批發價大跌，較去年同期下降18%，形成與前一年短缺際遇截然不同的局面。

過剩嚴重到部分雞蛋被用作豬糧，顯示市場極度失衡。多數農戶處於虧損，生產成本約每台斤28元，而市場價僅在21-24元間，迫使農場進行提前淘汰及強制換羽以削減產量。

政府及臺北蛋商公會於2024年末介入，將價格托底至每台斤34元，以協助農戶度過難關。虧損壓力巨大，若不介入，恐致農戶破產，形成新缺蛋危機。

2025年中：供應再緊縮與價格回升

2025年中，受多種交互因素影響，蛋市再次轉向：

• 天氣影響：颱風豪雨破壞農場與雞舍，暫時減少蛋產量。

• 消費需求轉變：蔬菜價格飆升，促使消費者及餐館以雞蛋替代蛋白質。

• 禽流感威脅持續，造成產能不穩。

上述因素致使2024年低點後蛋價適度反彈，雖未回到2023年初的極高水準，但供需關係明顯轉緊。

價格波動的關鍵驅動因素

台灣蛋價起伏由以下主要因素塑造：

禽流感

禽流感是主要的供應衝擊因子。自2022年底連續爆發H5N1，導致大量雞隻撲殺，蛋產量嚴重縮減。台灣傳統籠養系統擁擠，助長病毒迅速傳播。雖有推動畜舍現代化，但進展緩慢，致使風險依然很大。

天氣與氣候事件

台灣氣候多變，包括寒流、颱風及熱浪，顯著影響蛋產量。冬季寒冷抑制產蛋，酷暑及風暴則導致產能下降及飼料配送受阻。蔬菜價格高漲引發替代需求，亦加劇價格壓力。

飼料及生產成本

飼料成本為蛋農最大支出，依賴進口玉米及大豆。自2021年以來全球原料價格上漲，限制農戶於短缺期擴產意願，反之價格崩跌期間，農戶則面臨成本無法回收困境，利潤擠壓嚴重。

供應鏈結構

帶有半管制的銷售系統及固定批發價限制市場對供需變化的快速反應。官方價格經常滯後，短缺時出現黑市流通及分銷效率低下，缺乏庫存儲備及協調能力，加劇供需失衡。

政府因應與政策措施

台灣政府採取多項手段穩定蛋市：

• 緊急進口及補貼成本，緩解2023年短缺。

• 實施暫時價格管制，抑制價格暴漲。

• 2024年因應過剩而支持價格地板與加快淘汰弱雞。

• 投資農場基礎設施現代化及氣候適應。

• 透過產量數據公開和進口規範提升透明度，回應進口安全爭議。

• 探討建立戰略庫存與蛋粉儲備，預防未來衝擊附檔:1。

對消費者、企業與通膨的影響

消費者

2023年蛋價飆升嚴重衝擊家庭預算，尤以倚賴蛋類的低收入戶。超市限購及哄抬價格成為普遍現象。2024年過剩期零售價調降緩慢，消費者未能全面受惠。消費者更關注供應鏈風險，進口蛋安全疑慮提升本地蛋價值認同。

餐飲與零售業

蛋為重要原料，價格波動導致餐飲業成本震盪，部分調漲菜單價格或改版以調整成本。過剩時期降低成本增利潤，惟零售價格調降延遲影響需求恢復。零售業需兼顧庫存管理及進口雞蛋接受度，特別在2023年安全事件後。

通膨

蛋價波動引發台灣物價波動，惟對整體通膨影響有限，年度通膨率仍維持低於2%。蛋價成為通膨感知的指標商品，2023年推高食物價格，2024年下跌緩解壓力，2025年溫和反彈。政策制定者密切監控蛋價變化，調節物價期待及生活成本壓力。

展望：打造韌性蛋市

台灣經驗凸顯建立靈活及有韌性的蛋供應鏈的重要性。政策與產業議題包括：

• 現代化畜牧場，提升防疫機制。

• 改進市場透明度及價格靈活機制，反映真實供需。

• 多元化進口來源，提升冷鏈與品質控管。

• 建立戰略備貨，如蛋粉儲備以籌備衝擊。

• 支援農戶應對成本與氣候風險波動附檔:1。

氣候變遷及持續疫病風險意味波動趨勢難改。台灣需在保護消費者與維持農戶間找到平衡，避免短缺與過剩週期反覆。

結論

雞蛋看似平凡的家庭必需品，實際上反映了農業生產、市場力學與政策複雜交織。台灣2023至2025年的蛋價波動揭示了系統弱點，也促使政策與市場改善。

政府進口與價格管制緩和危機，但禽流感、天候與飼料成本造成的波動週期仍持續。消費者與企業共同承受影響，通膨數據亦反映此波動。

未來，台灣將藉由現代化、協調與風險管理，致力穩定蛋供應鏈，確保早餐餐桌常有雞蛋及價格穩定。蛋市的敏感性提醒我們，全球與地方因素如何共同影響食物安全與經濟穩定。

By: Nathan S.

Early 2023: Severe Shortages and Price Surges

In early 2023, Taiwan faced an acute egg shortage that drove wholesale egg prices to unprecedented highs, reaching NT55 per catty (600 grams), a record level. Daily egg supply gaps peaked at around 500,000 to 800,000 eggs. This shortage emerged from multiple factors coming together:

• Avian influenza outbreaks decimated flocks, forcing large-scale culling of laying hens nationwide.

• Cold weather stress during winter suppressed hen laying rates.

• The culling of older hens following Lunar New Year led to a temporary dip in production capacity.

• High feed costs, mainly from elevated global corn and soy prices, discouraged farmers from expanding production, squeezing margins.

The government responded with emergency measures including raising official egg prices to incentivize supply (from NT52 to NT55 per catty) and initiating extensive imports of eggs and live hens from about a dozen countries. Approximately 145 million eggs were imported from March to July 2023 to fill the shortage gap. This large-scale intervention successfully stabilized the supply and prices by mid to late 2023.

Transition to Surplus: Price Collapse in 2024

By late 2023, Taiwan’s egg market saw a turnaround—imports, new hens maturing, and improving weather combined to push supply beyond demand. Production consistently exceeded daily demand by over a million eggs by mid-2024, sparking an oversupply or glut phase. Wholesale prices plummeted, falling 18% year-over-year by June 2024 and leading to stark contrasts from the previous year’s shortage.

The oversupply was so pronounced that surplus eggs were reportedly used as hog feed, an indicator of extreme market imbalance. Many farmers struggled with profitability, producing eggs below the breakeven cost of about NT28 per catty, while market prices hovered near NT21-24 per catty. This financial pressure forced early flock culling to reduce output.

In response, the Taipei Egg Merchants Association and government took action to floor prices around NT34 per catty by late 2024 to help farmers stay afloat. Farmers’ losses had reached a critical point, and without intervention, widespread bankruptcies threatened to set the stage for another shortage cycle.

Mid-2025: Re-tightening Supply and Rising Prices

The egg market shifted again in mid-2025 due to intertwined factors:

• Weather impacts: Typhoons and heavy rains disrupted farms, damaged henhouses, and temporarily reduced egg production.

• Consumer demand shifts: A spike in vegetable prices prompted consumers and restaurants to substitute eggs for protein, boosting egg demand.

• Continuing avian influenza threats also played a role in production uncertainties.

These supply strains and demand upticks pushed prices upward again from the 2024 trough, although prices did not reach the extreme highs of early 2023. The combination of supply disruptions and substitution effects contributed to a moderate rebound in egg prices.

Key Drivers of Price Volatility

Taiwan’s egg price swings have been shaped by several core factors:

Avian Influenza

Bird flu outbreaks were the primary catalyst for supply shocks. Large-scale culling of infected flocks, especially H5N1 cases, sharply cut egg output in multiple waves since late 2022. Taiwan’s traditional battery cage farming system, with cramped conditions, facilitated rapid virus spread. Efforts to modernize poultry housing have progressed slowly, leaving vulnerabilities exposed.

Weather and Climate Events

Taiwan’s climate volatility, featuring cold snaps, typhoons, and heatwaves, significantly influences egg production. Cold winters suppress laying, while heat stress and storm damage reduce output and disrupt feed delivery. The substitution effect, higher vegetable prices driving egg demand, has compounded price pressures during adverse weather episodes.

Feed and Input Costs

Feed costs, mostly for corn and soymeal import-dependent in Taiwan, represent the largest production expense. Global price spikes since 2021 raised feeding costs substantially, limiting farmer incentives to maintain or expand output during shortages. Conversely, during price collapses, farmers struggled to cover high input costs, squeezing margins and triggering production cuts.

Supply Chain Structure

A semi-regulated sales system with fixed wholesale prices and regional exclusivity constrains rapid market responses to supply-demand changes. Official prices often lag real market conditions, encouraging black markets during shortages and inefficiencies in redistribution. Limited reserve stocks and fragmented supply chains amplified imbalances during shocks.

Government Responses and Policy Measures

Taiwan’s government has wielded a range of interventions to stabilize the egg market:

• Emergency imports and subsidies covering import cost gaps helped ease the 2023 shortage.

• Temporary price controls and ceilings were introduced during the crisis to prevent runaway prices.

• Later, government-endorsed price floors and measures to accelerate hen culling sought to address the 2024 surplus and prevent farm bankruptcies.

• Investments in farm infrastructure modernization and climate adaptation were proposed to improve long-term resilience.

• Enhanced transparency, daily local production data publication, and cautious import policy shifts aimed to rebuild consumer trust after import scandals.

• Strategic discussions about egg stockpiling and powdered egg reserves are underway as potential buffers against future crises.

Impact on Consumers, Businesses, and Inflation

Consumers

Egg price spikes in 2023 strained household budgets, especially for lower-income families relying on eggs as an affordable protein source. Grocery rationing, hoarding, and price surges hit consumers directly. During the surplus period, retail prices lagged wholesale price drops, limiting consumer savings. Consumers became more aware of supply chain risks and displayed greater preference for local eggs amid import controversies.

Food Service and Retailers

Restaurants, bakeries, and food vendors that depend heavily on eggs faced input cost shocks, passing on prices or altering menus during shortages. In surplus phases, reduced costs provided margins or promotions, but delayed retail price adjustments dampened demand recovery. Supermarkets had to balance inventory challenges and consumer skepticism around imported eggs, especially after the 2023 food safety lapses.

Inflation

Egg price swings contributed to Taiwan’s food inflation volatility but had a contained overall effect on headline inflation, which remained below 2% annually. Eggs became a symbol of inflation pains in 2023, with subsequent price drops providing moderate relief in 2024 before a mild rebound in 2025. Policymakers closely monitored egg price effects when managing inflation expectations and cost-of-living pressures.

Looking Forward: Building a Resilient Egg Market

Taiwan’s recent experience highlights the need for a more flexible, resilient egg supply chain. Policy and industry discussions focus on:

• Modernizing poultry farms to reduce disease risk and improve biosecurity.

• Enhancing market transparency and flexible pricing mechanisms reflecting true supply-demand dynamics.

• Diversifying import sources with better cold-chain logistics and quality control.

• Establishing strategic reserves such as powdered eggs to buffer shocks.

• Supporting farmers with viable economics despite input cost volatility and climate risks.

Weather extremes and persistent disease threats linked to global patterns mean volatility may continue. Taiwan’s delicate balancing act between protecting consumers and sustaining producers will be critical to avoid future cycles of shortages and gluts.

Conclusion

While eggs are a simple household staple, their price and supply dynamics capture the complex web of agricultural production, market forces, and public policy. Taiwan’s volatile egg market from 2023 to 2025 revealed vulnerabilities but also prompted valuable reforms and awareness.

Government emergency imports and price controls helped avert starvation crises but market inefficiencies and shocks from bird flu, weather, and feed costs drove cycles of boom and bust prices. Consumers and food businesses alike felt the impact, and inflation statistics carried the echoes.

Taiwan’s path forward involves boosting resilience through modernization, better coordination, and innovative risk management, aiming to keep Taiwan’s breakfast tables reliably stocked with eggs at stable prices in coming years. The delicate sensitivity of this market underscores how tight global and local factors govern everyday food security and economic stability.

By: Nathan S.

Advanced packaging, in the form of TSMC’s CoWoS (chip on wafer on substrate) technology, has emerged as the pivot of the AI era, transforming from a technical process to a strategic bottleneck. Moreover, Taiwan’s central bank on September 18, 2025 revised its growth forecast for 2025 to 4.55% up from June’s 3.05%, attributing the increase largely to semiconductor exports. Electronics and ICT products constituted 42.2% of Taiwan’s total exports in the first 8 months of the year, valued at nearly USD$400 billion,which demonstrates the dominance of this industry.

However, the Bank also predicted a change to 2.86% in 2026, cautioning against tariff headwinds, as well as heightened policy uncertainty. Additionally, Taipei has been active in leveraging its semiconductor prowess into geopolitical leverage. At SEMICON Taiwan 2025, government officials spoke openly about semiconductors as instruments of “chip diplomacy”, which suggests Taiwan’s interest in binding its democratic allies more closely through technology than formal diplomatic recognition Institutional alignment has followed. The appointment of Kung Ming-hsin (former TSMC board member, as Minister of Economic Affairs) further institutionalizes the connection between national policy and industrial strategy

Furthermore, the AI supply chain’s weakest point is not wafer lithography but advanced packaging capacity. Demand for CoWoS outstrips available throughput, compelling TSMC to double its capacity by adding new sites in Chiayi and elsewhere. Additionally, CoWoS (once a relatively obscure process), has become a geopolitical tool: without it, Nvidia’s GPUs cannot properly match compute dies with high bandwidth memory, the dividing line between cutting edge AI and obsolescence.

The chip giant is bumping up against infrastructural limits. TSMC alone consumed 6.4% of Taiwan’s power in 2021; by 2025 fab expansions and AI targeted data centers have raised that figure significantly. For example, Foxconn- Nvidia AI factory in Koshiung, which was originally planned at 100MW will be developed in phases “subject to power availability”- a sidelong acknowledgement of Taiwan’s strained grid. Industry groups have demanded a moratorium on further electricity price hikes, arguing that higher tariffs would erode competitiveness and burden households.

Complicating matters, Taiwan shut down its last nuclear reactor in May 2025, increasing reliance on imported liquefied natural gas while also pledging net zero. This double blind energy security has become an existential policy dilemma. Externally, Taiwan faces a matrix of threats. US tariff measures against specific Taiwanese products cast a pall over 2026, even as semiconductors receive exemptions in some categories. Meanwhile, Nvidia’s US$5billion investment in Intel hints at a potential restructuring of the global AI compute stack. If successful, it could dilute Taiwan’s stranglehold on advanced packaging, though for now at least, leading edge manufacturing remains Taiwan-centric. However, in comparison, Huawei’s resurgence in indigenous chip design presents a long term competitive counterweight which intensifies the regional tech race.

All in all, Taiwan’s semiconductor sector is simultaneously its greatest strength as well as being its most vulnerable weakness. Its economic windfall has propelled GDP growth to heights beyond expectations but its infrastructural vulnerability especially in packaging and energy threatens to truncate the very gains it generates. Therefore, over the next 2 years, Taiwan needs to insert CoWoS capacity, steady its energy supply, and balance geoeconomic risk without sacrificing comparative advantage. Success would solidify Taiwan’s status as the fulcrum of the AI era; failure to do so could expose its prosperity as perilously contingent.

By: Megan C

Sources:

Reuters – Taiwan c.bank leaves benchmark rate unchanged at 2%
https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/taiwan-cbank-leaves-benchmark-interest-rate-unchanged-2-2025-09-18

Reuters – Taiwan central bank raises growth forecast, warns of tariff risks
https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/taiwan-central-bank-raises-growth-forecast-warns-tariff-risks-2025-09-18

FocusTaiwan (CNA) – Taiwan’s exports January–August 2025, electronics 42.2%
https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202509200015

*Grey-zone tactics refer to the ambiguous space between peace and overt warfare. Grey-zone tactics often consist of a heightened military presence as a form of intimidation, and also include cyberattacks, election meddling, disinformation campaigns, and economic disruption through the undermining of valuable supplies.

Yielding to pressure from the U.S., Taiwan is set to increase its defense budget to 949.5 billion New Taiwan Dollars in 2026, which is equivalent to over 31 billion dollars in U.S. currency. This represents a 22.9% increase compared to 2025—an enormous jump for a single-year increase in budget. Setting the defense budget to over 949 billion NTD means that the defense spending will be well over 3% of Taiwan’s GDP, closer to 3.32%.3 This will be the first time in over a decade that Taiwan’s defense budget exceeds 3% of its GDP. The last time Taiwan’s GDP exceeded 3% was in 2009, under former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) president Ma Ying-Jeou.4

However, it should be noted that Taiwan will adopt a NATO model of calculating defense expenditures in 2026. NATO-style metrics incorporate spending on veteran support and coast guard administration in defense expenditures, and the inclusion of the latter is attributed to their having to deal with China’s grey-zone incursions. The defense budget for 2026 will be 2.84% if we take out the traditionally excluded costs of spending on veteran support and Coast Guard administration. This also decreases the exaggerated single-year increase from 22.9% to 20.1%, a much lower yet still striking increase.5

There is no consensus regarding whether this increase in defense budget was a necessary choice or an unnecessarily ambitious misstep. Figures such as United States President Donald Trump have contended that Taiwan needs to refrain from being overly dependent on American military backing, therefore making it likely that said figures see this increase as a positive development.6 However, the Institute of National Defense and Strategic Research reveals survey results stating that 65% of Taiwanese believe it to be unlikely that China will attack within the next five years, making it likely for locals to be reproachful about the sudden and stupendous change.7 After all, the 20+% increase in spending for defense needs to be subtracted from other areas of spending—infrastructure, welfare, and other priorities that citizens may find benefit them more directly.

Taiwan’s current demographic situation is a possible complication in this dilemma. As Taiwan is one of the fastest-aging societies in the world, social welfare is incredibly important yet severely underfunded. Even by 2016, public sector and labour pension liabilities had ballooned to 9 times the national budget, adding up to a total of around $570 billion U.S. dollars.8 So, this puts into perspective how important and already lacking Taiwan’s social welfare funds are, and why, at this point in time, safeguarding the social welfare budget may be a better strategy. Any more national budget deducted from social welfare could result in not only severe consequences in the form of inadequate social programs but also in intensifying social discontent.*

*Read Nathan’s article about Taiwan’s aging society and its implications here: https://taiwanfinanceeconomics.substack.com/p/silver-hair-wave-taiwans-aging-population

Yet, despite the possible cuts in government spending for social welfare, the build-up in defense investment could stimulate the economy by invigorating domestic industries and companies. Taiwan’s many, globally competitive, high-tech sectors—semiconductors, aerospace, cyber-defense—will all likely benefit from the increased procurement and R&D spending that will accompany this change.9 If Taiwan can successfully overcome issues such as significant arms delivery delays10 and major GDP growth reductions due to legislative gridlocks on defense spending,11 both of which have been prominent issues in the past, this change could be beneficial for relations with the U.S., domestic industries, and bolster deterrence.

In the end, there’s no definitive answer to whether or not this sharp increase in defense budget was a wise and strategic modification, or if it was a fatal misstep that may be costly to the Taiwanese people and economy. However, we will soon see the effects of it and how it shapes the lives of locals in Taiwan, domestic businesses, and international relations.

By: Sihyun P.

(https://substack.com/@hyunnpark)

Sources Compiled:

1. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-massively-hike-2026-defence-budget-us-presses-spending-increase-2025-08-21/

2. https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-us-defense-budget-b15c2dc87297627a2ac12ea344fe94b8

3. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/08/22/2003842464

4. https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/taiwans-government-eyes-expanded-defense-budget-at-3-3-of-gdp/

5. https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-us-defense-budget-b15c2dc87297627a2ac12ea344fe94b8

6. https://www.benefitscanada.com/news/bencan/do-taiwans-cuts-to-public-sector-pensions-offer-lessons-for-canada/

7. https://www.ainvest.com/news/taiwan-defense-spending-surge-unlocking-geopolitical-driven-opportunities-tech-industrial-sectors-2509/

8. https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/taiwans-biggest-limitation-in-defense-isnt-spending-its-late-deliveries-from-u-s-defense-companies/

9. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2025/03/04/2003832827

台灣的綠色金融行動方案

邁向永續金融的趨勢並非毫無理由而發生。台灣政府自 2017 年首次推出「綠色金融行動方案」，至 2022 年已進入第三階段，積極推動這一轉變。這一政策架構推動金融體系支持島嶼的長期永續目標，透過：

將資金流導向再生能源與電動車等綠色產業。

提高 ESG 揭露標準，讓企業符合全球透明度基準。

擴展綠色金融產品，如綠色債券、永續連結貸款，以及 ESG 保險。

強化氣候風險管理，確保銀行與投資者在決策中納入環境風險。

簡言之，台灣 ESG 投資的快速崛起不僅是市場動能，也是政府政策將金融與 2050 淨零轉型對齊的結果。

台灣 ESG 的數據概況

根據 2024 年台灣永續投資調查，台灣永續投資總額達到 23.1 兆新台幣，佔全台資產管理總額（AUM）的近 43%。調查結果突顯出台灣市場中永續金融的顯著上升趨勢，相較 2022 年的 19.9 兆新台幣 / 40.2% AUM，顯示出成長。更深入觀察，數據反映出 ESG 配置的年增率 / 年對年（YoY）成長 16.2%，已接近佔全台資產的一半。

以投資人類型拆解 ESG 投資：

壽險公司仍是 ESG 投資領導者，永續資產佔其投資組合的 59%。

政府基金快速擴張，從 2022 年的 1.29 兆新台幣，成長至 2023 年的 2.73 兆新台幣（111.5% 增長）。

證券公司與投資顧問亦有所貢獻，增幅達 29.6%。更值得注意的是，單投資顧問的永續資產規模增加了 241.4%，目前管理約 200 億新台幣的永續資產。

ESG 基金：數量與價值的成長

台灣集中保管結算所（TDCC）追蹤本地與海外 ESG 基金。截至 2024 年 5 月：

本地有 24 檔，海外有 13 檔 ESG 主題基金，共計 37 檔，總資產約 6090 億新台幣。

前三大本地 ESG 基金的資產規模各自超過約 3 億美元：

國泰 MSCI 台灣 ESG 永續高股息 ETF：約 745 億新台幣

中信台灣 ESG 領先半導體 ETF：約 205 億新台幣

柏瑞全球 ESG 量化債券基金：約 165 億新台幣

超越數字之外

當你購買一檔 ESG 基金時，你買的不僅僅是股票。你買的是一個關於世界走向的故事。

以國泰 MSCI 台灣 ESG 永續高股息 ETF 為例，它是台灣最大的 ESG 基金，規模約 745 億新台幣。這檔基金並非只專注於獲利，而是獎勵那些既能穩定發放股息又能符合永續標準的公司。因此，它受到投資人歡迎，因為能在不犧牲價值觀的前提下，提供長期穩定性。

再看中信台灣 ESG 領先半導體 ETF。為什麼是半導體？因為台灣的晶片產業正面臨全球壓力，必須證明它既能高科技又能綠色永續。這檔基金讓投資者能夠接觸台灣最重要的產業，同時確保這些公司實際上正在解決永續問題。

ESG 的運作方式：塑造市場的策略

目前，台灣大多數 ESG 投資仍仰賴「負面篩選」（基本上是避免投資於煤炭或菸草等對環境有害的行業）。但更進階的策略正逐步興起：

整合：將 ESG 評分與基本面財務分析結合，讓公司的碳足跡成為選股決策的一部分。

積極所有權：投資者運用股東權力推動企業改變政策，例如採用更清潔的能源或增加董事會多元性。

ESG 與能源轉型的交會

台灣 ESG 的成長與其能源挑戰緊密相連。隨著再生能源在 2024 年佔台灣電力 16.8%，目標是在 2026 年達到 20%。對於像台積電這樣耗能龐大的企業來說，證明自己能使用綠電不只是公關，而是為了滿足全球客戶需求的必要條件。

事實上，像 Google（確保台灣資料中心能使用更乾淨的電力）與貝萊德（把握投資亞洲最快速成長再生能源市場之一的機會，同時為投資人帶來回報）等國際巨頭，甚至直接投資於新綠能（台灣主要的太陽能開發商）。他們的選擇傳遞了一個強烈訊息：如果你想投資台灣的未來，ESG 與能源將會是核心。

為什麼這對你很重要

從中得到什麼啟示？

ESG = 機會 + 責任：你可以獲得回報，同時支持真正關心地球的企業。

追隨大資金的流向：當保險公司與政府基金將 ESG 配置翻倍，這或許就是長期成長的訊號。

現在就開始嘗試：即使是模擬投資組合，也能幫助你練習建立 ESG 專注的策略。

思考你熟悉的產業：科技、半導體與再生能源是台灣的優勢，這些也是值得關注的強勢 ESG 主題。

最後的想法

台灣 ESG 的崛起不僅僅是關於法規或打勾，而是關於重新想像投資的意義。對我們這一代人來說，這可能是財務成功與有意義影響之間的橋樑。問題很簡單：當我們 10 年後回顧時，我們要說自己只是遵循舊的投資玩法，還是我們選擇投資於那些正在建造未來的公司？

資料來源

• 2024 臺灣永續投資調查報告 (Taiwan Sustainable Investment Survey 2024)
  https://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/20241225/8a828e1793ce5bea0193fb5cc4f1000e_2024%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E6%B0%B8%E7%BA%8C%E6%8A%95%E8%B3%87%E8%AA%BF%E6%9F%A5%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A-final.pdf

• TAISE 2024 Hosts the 4th Taiwan Sustainable Investment Forum
  https://www.energy-omni.com/en/news/article/2b8Zzb9ti5MRaHuB

• 2024年台灣永續投資發展報告：市場規模與參與度同步成長，策略多元化趨勢明顯
  https://eco-fin.tpex.org.tw/ESGNewsDetail/88

• TDCC – ESG-related Funds and Sustainable Investment Report (May 2024)
  https://www.tdcc.com.tw/portal/en/publication/special/263

• TAISE / TCSA – Taiwan Sustainable Investment Forum and Awards Coverage
  https://tcsaward.org.tw/en/news/index/502

• 黃啟瑞教授》永續投資持續升溫，臺灣投資規模已達23.1兆 (ESG Times)
  https://esgtimes.com.tw/10492-2/

• What Is Negative Screening?
  https://www.tejwin.com/en/insight/what-is-negative-screening/

• Google buys stake in Taiwan solar power firm owned by BlackRock (Reuters)
  https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/google-buys-stake-taiwan-solar-power-firm-owned-by-blackrock-2024-07-01/